@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Goodman,Nelson}, subject = {Similarity}, note = {I 95 Similarity/Goodman: while we obviously have a similarity measure for sizes, we have none for similarity or dissimilarity of different shapes. --- III 15f Self-similarity/representation/Goodman: an object is similar to itself to the highest degree, but rarely represents itself. Similarity is, unlike representation, reflexive. A painting of the castle of Marlborough Constable is more similar to any other picture, than to the castle and yet it represents the castle and not another picture, not even the most faithful copy. >Representation, cf. >Forgery. III 42ff The proposed measure for realism exists in the likelihood of confusion between representation with the represented. This is an important advance over the image theory. If the likelihood of confusion = 1, then we have no more representation, then we have identity. Even with a trompe l'oeuil the probability rarely rises above zero, because seeing a picture as a picture excludes to mistake it for something else. (> Forgery). III 43f E.g. a copy that is painted in negative colors: the second picture provides exactly the same level of information. The information income is not a measure for realism. Realism is relative. >Information, >Realism. --- IV 150 We often know what an image represents, without knowing (or without us worrying about) whether it is similar to his subject. E.g. we do not know whether images of the Crucifixion are similar to the actual happening. Nonetheless, we can, of course, say what these images represent. IV 151 Every thing has a lot of views. Therefore the assertion that an image looks like its subject means not that a particular relationship between the two is specified. >Aspects. IV 152 X-ray or cloud chamber photographs also have no resemblance to the visible aspects of their subjects. >Picture, >Image, >Mapping. IV 163 Even if an image has a clearly recognizable resemblance to its subject, we are not always able to perceive this similarity, if we do not know what we should look for. Knowing how to look at a picture is necessary to recognize the ways in which it resembles its subject. To reject similarity as a basis for pictorial representation does not mean that everything can be a picture of everything else. Wrong: that comparative similarity is a preceding constant that acts as a measure for realism.}, note = { G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=198499} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=198499} }