@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Tugendhat, E.},
subject = {Meaning},
note = {I 21
Meaning/Tugendhat ultimately not based on objects (not any more than on circumstances) but on truth conditions - later verification conditions.
>Truth conditions, >Verification conditions, >Verification, >Circumstances/Tugendhat.
I 263
Sentence: Meaning/Tugendhat by specifying its truth conditions - and explains this by demonstrating the way of verification.
>Sentence meaning.
I 282
Meaning/Tugendhat: the meaning of the sentence p is not the fact that p : that fails with sentences that contain deictic expressions. - Different situations have different truth conditions.
>Situations, cf. >Situation semantics.
I 283
Meaning/Tugendhat: of a sentence: function.
Arguments: use-situations of the sentence.
Values: the assertions (truth conditions).
>Functions, >Use, >Use theory (only for words, not for sentences).
I 432
Meaning/Tugendhat: function whose arguments are the speech situations and their values are the objects . "The meaning maps the speech situations on the items".
Vs: that is metalinguistically - it requires understanding of " I " , "here", etc. first to understand - (because demontratives are not names). Substitutability is the meaning of demonstratives.
>Understanding, cf. >Speaker meaning, >Substitution, >Demonstratives.
- - -
II 231
Meaning/Frege/Tugendhat: should not be translate as "reference". Only where Frege conceives sentences as a proper name.
>Reference, >Fregean meaning, >Fregean sense, >Sense.
Frege distinguishes between reference of names and truth values of sentences.
>Truth values, >Sentences.
II 240
Otherwise error/Frege: ... that you can mingle meaning and concept on the one hand and meaning and subject matter on the other hand. - Correct: "What two concept words ( predicates ) mean is the same iff the corresponding extents (value progression) coincide.
>Value progression, >Term scope.
II 247
Tugendhat: (meaning/reference): nevertheless there is a primacy of truth over the objects.
>Truth/Tugendhat, >Truth.
II 242
Meaning/Tugendhat: sentences are meaningful in that they can be true/false. - predicates by apply to some (and not others) objects.
>True-of, >Satisfaction.
Names: denote something.
Predicates can be attributed to a thing.
>Names, >Predication.},
note = { Tu I E. Tugendhat Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Sprachanalytische Philosophie Frankfurt 1976 Tu II E. Tugendhat Philosophische Aufsätze Frankfurt 1992
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=204211}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=204211}
}