@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Brandom,Robert},
subject = {Meaning Change},
note = {I 670
Change of concept/Change of meaning/QuineVsFeyerabend: Solution: The semantically relevant is not the meaning but the reference. >Meaning, >Reference.
What we want to represent, and not what we say about it - the extensional content is communicated - even from a Zoroastrian you can find out whether the sun is shining. - Inferential significances which indeed vary from one speaker to another do not matter then. Instead, there are extensions that vary from possible world to possible worlds. >Extensions, >Possible worlds.
I 671
Content/Concept change/Scheffler/Boyd/Putnam: content is no longer viewed as inferential role: inference can be re-introduced at two levels. >Content, >Inferential role, >Inferential content.
a) some inferential accuracies can be read from inclusion relations between the extensions of predicates
b) insight into the relativity of extensions against various context elements leads to a new concept of intensions:
Definition intension: functions of indices to extensions! >Intensions, >Extensions.
A more robust type of content that is at best shared by the audience. (BrandomVs).
Scheffler/Boyd/PutnamVsFeyerabend: Progress as talk of more and more objects that bring more and more predicate extensions into play). - Inferential significances which indeed vary from one speaker to another do not matter - instead there are extensions that vary from possible world to possible world.
I 671f
Inferential contents as functions/Change of concept: possible solution: ordered pairs of circumstances and consequences of the use. >Use, >Circumstances.
Advantage: It would not be necessary to always admit that the meaning of the word changes with every new belief.
BrandomVs: cannot explain why one intension and not the other is now associated.
I 673
Problem: functions can only be constructed by arguments which are beyond behavioral dispositions.
Change of concept/Intensional theory/BrandomVs: not easy to show: e.g. that the early theorists used "electron" intensionally in a way that allowed plenty of room for our rethinking.
QuineVs: reference instead of meaning! (see above).},
note = { Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=204694}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=204694}
}