@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Quine,W.V.O.},
subject = {Observation Sentences},
note = {II 43
Categorical observation sentences: are independent of time and space "Where there’s smoke, there’s fire" - are learned through language learning - knowledge still needs space/time - but they are theoretical terms - Truth of categorical observation sentences not by observation - But falsification (> Falsification/Popper).
II 43~
Empirical content = categorical observation sentences: are linking theory and observation - two theories are equivalent if all categorical sentences are identical - theory implies categorical sentences without being implied by them - a theoretical term does not appear in categorical sentence.
II 218f
Observation sentences are not about the experience! ((s) but about language, learning, situation, circumstances) - Quine: but they are fairly analog to the experience - single observation sentences are quite independent of each other.
VI 6
Observation sentence/compound/Quine: complex observation sentence is not merely a conjunction "There is blue" and "There is a pebble" - but "This pebble is blue".
VI 9
Sentences enter the link with stimulus leeway as a whole - N.B.: in this case they do not contain words, but only syllables! ((s)> Language learning, conditioning).
VI 10
Observation sentence/weight of theory/Quine: learned in connection with the stimulus situation, the sentence is free of theory - but considered word by word it contains theory.
>Stimulus/Quine.
VI 11/12
Language learning/observation sentence/ontology/Quine: we assume full sentences - if we had assumed single words, we would have ignored the problem of ontology and would already have assumed objects.
>Sentences/Quine.
VI 12f
Categorical observation sentence/Quine: brings hypothesis: "As soon as this, then that".
VI 13
But no reification of points in time.
VI 15
Circumstances: should be accompanying constantly - this makes pronouns and anaphora necessary - but not observation conditional: this is gained from un-timed (timeless) sentences using the theory.
VI 59ff
Observation sentence/Quine: new: no longer intersubjective agreement as a criterion.
VI 61
But fluidity of communication - and efficiency of practical contact - therein lies the "factualness".
XII 101
Definition observation sentence/naturalized epistemology/Quine: the sentences that are causally closest to the receptors - problem: "how to eliminate superfluous information?"
XII 102
Better: sentence which is insensitive within a community when it comes to differences in past experiences.
XII 103
In larger communities, the number of recognized object languages drops.
>Object Language/Quine.
XII 105
Decide: identity of the leeway of stimuli - ((s) Set of possible deviations must be the same for all members.)},
note = { Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987
},
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}