@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Strawson,Peter F.},
subject = {Consciousness},
note = {I 114
Consciousness/Strawson: why do we attribute it to a subject at all? - Why do we always atribute our experiences to the same subject?
Descartes: body plays a unique role for everyone.
Cf. >Apperception/Kant, >Apprehension/Kant.
I 115
Strawson: face experiences depend on three things:
1) whether eyes opened,
2) where directed,
3) position of the body
E.g. subject with three bodies: whether eyelids of A and B open irrelevant for whether C can see something.
I 119
Possession of my body does not explain my concept of a self.
>Body, >Self.
I 120f
Consciousness/Strawson: Descartes/Wittgenstein: both: attribution to body is a linguistic deception. 1) Descartes: "Person" refers to two very different substances, with types of states which are mutually exclusive.
>Descartes, >Person.
2) Wittgenstein: "It thinks".
(Strawson: ditto)
>Consciousness/Wittgenstein, >Thinking/Wittgenstein.
I 127
Consciousness/Self/I/Strawson: attributing states of consciousness and experiences to ourselves is a necessary condition for attributing them also to others.
>Intersubjectivity, >Recognition, >Other minds >Community.
Basis: notion of a class of predicates which require distinct individuals to whom they can be attributed.
>Predicates/Strawson.
I 129
Other individuals must be identified +through body, not merely as carriers of consciousness. - But this is not a simple refutation of Descartes, because s already presupposes that I have found a simple relation between my experiences and body M, which I'm still looking for.
I 147
Consciousness/Strawson: pointless to speak of a single consciousness.
I 171
Consciousness/Strawson: only possible as a secondary, non-basic particular.
>Particulars/Strawson.},
note = { Strawson I Peter F. Strawson Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics. London 1959 German Edition: Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972 Strawson II Peter F. Strawson "Truth", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol XXIV, 1950 - dt. P. F. Strawson, "Wahrheit", In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Strawson III Peter F. Strawson "On Understanding the Structure of One’s Language" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Strawson IV Peter F. Strawson Analysis and Metaphysics. An Introduction to Philosophy, Oxford 1992 German Edition: Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994 Strawson V P.F. Strawson The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. London 1966 German Edition: Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981 Strawson VI Peter F Strawson Grammar and Philosophy in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol 70, 1969/70 pp. 1-20 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Strawson VII Peter F Strawson "On Referring", in: Mind 59 (1950) In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993
},
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url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=208648}
}