@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Chisholm,Roderick}, subject = {de dicto}, note = {I 65 de dicto/Chisholm: either "property, to be so that p" or "the fact that p is true" - attribution de dicto: does not need demonstratives, proper names or free variables. >Attribution, >Demonstratives, >Facts. - - - II 118 Wrong: de dicto-belief would be enough for standing in a special relationship with the object alone by the fact that it exists. >Acquaintance. Vs: we need a more stringent notion of de re belief, objects must be able to be identified. de re: I cannot believe anything about the smallest spy before I know him personally. >Individuation, >Identification. ((s) But then also under another description - at least two relations to the object). >Description. Brandl, Johannes. Gegen den Primat des Intentionalen. In: M.David/L. Stubenberg (Hg) Philosophische Aufsätze zu Ehren von R.M. Chisholm Graz 1986}, note = { Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=211248} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=211248} }