@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Chisholm,Roderick},
subject = {Sensations},
note = {II 190
Sensation/perception/ChisholmVsSense data/Stubenberg: adverbial analysis of sensation: The object appears to us in a certain way: e.g., in a red way. "Red" is not understood here as an adjective.
Appearing in a certain way is a non-relational property.
II 191
Vs: Question: is this qualitative dimension not a mental or psychic aspect of the world?
The existence of the non-relational states of persons requires, in turn, the existence of a mind that has these states.
Chisholm/Stubenberg: This could be met with an innocuous definition of "mental."
II 192
Def "mental"/Chisholm: that which is immediately known. It is impossible for one to be appeared to in a certain way without knowing that one is appeared to in that way. This corresponds to Chisholm expression "self-presenting".
Now there is no reason to assume that only spirits could have such "spiritual" states. The property need not be of material nature! Even in a world which consists only of physical objects, spiritual qualities can be exemplified.
>Identification, >Individuation. >Self-knowledge.
Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986},
note = { Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=215799}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=215799}
}