@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Chisholm,Roderick}, subject = {Sensations}, note = {II 190 Sensation/perception/ChisholmVsSense data/Stubenberg: adverbial analysis of sensation: The object appears to us in a certain way: e.g., in a red way. "Red" is not understood here as an adjective. Appearing in a certain way is a non-relational property. II 191 Vs: Question: is this qualitative dimension not a mental or psychic aspect of the world? The existence of the non-relational states of persons requires, in turn, the existence of a mind that has these states. Chisholm/Stubenberg: This could be met with an innocuous definition of "mental." II 192 Def "mental"/Chisholm: that which is immediately known. It is impossible for one to be appeared to in a certain way without knowing that one is appeared to in that way. This corresponds to Chisholm expression "self-presenting". Now there is no reason to assume that only spirits could have such "spiritual" states. The property need not be of material nature! Even in a world which consists only of physical objects, spiritual qualities can be exemplified. >Identification, >Individuation. >Self-knowledge. Stubenberg, Leopold. Chisholm, Fechner und das Geist-Körper-Problem. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986}, note = { Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=215799} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=215799} }