@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Kripke,Saul A.}, subject = {Sensations}, note = {I 152 Sensation: let us say that it is a contingent property of heat to cause these sensations in people? Finally, it is also contingent that there are people on this planet at all. So you do not know a priori which physical phenomenon produces this or that sensation. I 167 f Sensation: acertain inventor (Franklin) could have existed without being an inventor. But a particular sensation (pain) could not have existed without being a sensation. >Pain/Kripke. I 167f Sensation: sensation is a mediator. Mental and physical: the mental and physical are no mediator, but identity (KripkeVs)! >Identity theory. Sensation: sensation has mediators between external phenomenon and observer. >Physical/psychic. I 167 One can have such a sensation without the presence of heat. In the case of pain and other mental phenomena that is not possible. Heat sensation is not equal to pain sensation. >a posteriori, >a priori. I 175 Heat: heat is rigid. Reference is determined by accidental properties (sensation, even without heat, deception possible). Pain: pain is rigid. The reference is determined by essential properties: if it feels like pain, it is pain. >Rigidity, >Reference. What God really has to do is turn this molecular movement into something that is perceived as heat! In order to do that, he must create some sentient beings. They can then go on and understand that the phrase "heat is the motion of molecules" expresses an a posteriori truth. I 175 In the case of excitation of the C-fibers, God would additionally have to make us feel this excitement as pain, and not as a tickle or as heat or as nothing. The relation between the two phenomena is not the identity. >Identity/Kripke.}, note = { Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=215827} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=215827} }