@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Field,Hartry}, subject = {Ersatz Worlds}, note = {I 226 Ersatz worlds resp. "Ersatz individuals"/Field: i.e. in Stalnaker's way of speaking: "To show how the world could be or could have been". That is, maximally determined properties that an individual might have or might have had in the universe. This can be used to define cross-world congruence. Cf. >Cross world identity. Then "Ersatz matter particles" are properties! Then "congruent" and "between" are higher-order predicates that are applied to properties. >Properties, >Predicates, >Second order logic, >Description levels/Field. Whereby xP is also an ersatz particle, one that is instantiated in the real world by the normal particle x. x is a normal particle, but the "ersatz particle" that corresponds to it, and by which conge and bete are defined, is a property, a "way like x could be" and actually a way how x is up to date. ((s) Ersatz-individual: here not a particular but a property, a "way".) Field: but this does not help relativism (the thesis that empty space is possible) either. >Relativism, >Relationism, cf. >Substantivalism.}, note = { Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=218029} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=218029} }