@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Pauen,Michael}, subject = {Functionalism}, note = {Pauen I 67 Multiple realizability: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. Split Brain: takeover by other areas). This is a problem for the identity theory and materialism. >Identity theory, >Materialism, >Brain states. I 130 Def Semantic functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: semantic functionalism reverts exclusively to everyday language behavioural vocabulary. >Everyday language, >Everyday psychology, >Explanation, >Behavior. I 132 Functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: Vs multiple realization (if the roles are determined accurately enough.) - That distinguishes him from most other functionalists. >D. Lewis. I 135f Psycho-functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in determining mental states. - The functional description can be pushed to an individual neuron. Representative: Dennett. Dennett: VsEveryday psychology: Problem: how to recognize simulation. >Simulation, >D. Dennett, >Psycho-functionalism.}, note = { Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=223279} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=223279} }