@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Pauen,Michael},
subject = {Functionalism},
note = {Pauen I 67
Multiple realizability: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. Split Brain: takeover by other areas).
This is a problem for the identity theory and materialism.
>Identity theory, >Materialism, >Brain states.
I 130
Def Semantic functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: semantic functionalism reverts exclusively to everyday language behavioural vocabulary.
>Everyday language, >Everyday psychology, >Explanation, >Behavior.
I 132
Functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: Vs multiple realization (if the roles are determined accurately enough.) - That distinguishes him from most other functionalists.
>D. Lewis.
I 135f
Psycho-functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in determining mental states. - The functional description can be pushed to an individual neuron.
Representative: Dennett.
Dennett: VsEveryday psychology: Problem: how to recognize simulation.
>Simulation, >D. Dennett, >Psycho-functionalism.},
note = { Pauen I M. Pauen Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=223279}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=223279}
}