@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Schiffer,Stephen}, subject = {Use Theory}, note = {I 187 Thinking/talking/meaning/use theory/Schiffer: language use in thinking is one thing, language use in speaking another - therefore, we need different theories. >Speaking, >Language use, >Thinking, >Language of thought. I 187 Use theory/reference/meaning/compositionality/Schiffer: new trend: (Putnam 1978)(1) thesis: we can have use theories of language comprehension (not the meaning) which do not require truth-theoretic semantics. - The theories of understanding and reference do not have so much to do with truth than most people think. Solution: if we start from the conceptual role (use) nothing is required by a "correspondence" of words and things. 1. Hilary Putnam (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences. Routledge I 260 Use/Use theory/Schiffer: no problem for simple signals: meaning = use. Problem: composite utterance type: s could mean p, even if never uttered. Solution/Schiffer: that is the reason why the practice should belong to language and not to the individual sentence. >Language use, >Situation semantics. Problem: we need an approach that requires no knowledge of the meaning in the community. - Otherwise everyone would have to understand every sentence. >Language community, >Understanding.}, note = { Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224181} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224181} }