@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Schiffer,Stephen},
subject = {Use Theory},
note = {I 187
Thinking/talking/meaning/use theory/Schiffer: language use in thinking is one thing, language use in speaking another - therefore, we need different theories.
>Speaking, >Language use, >Thinking, >Language of thought.
I 187
Use theory/reference/meaning/compositionality/Schiffer: new trend:
(Putnam 1978)(1) thesis: we can have use theories of language comprehension (not the meaning) which do not require truth-theoretic semantics. - The theories of understanding and reference do not have so much to do with truth than most people think.
Solution: if we start from the conceptual role (use) nothing is required by a "correspondence" of words and things.
1. Hilary Putnam (1978). Meaning and the Moral Sciences. Routledge
I 260
Use/Use theory/Schiffer: no problem for simple signals: meaning = use.
Problem: composite utterance type: s could mean p, even if never uttered.
Solution/Schiffer: that is the reason why the practice should belong to language and not to the individual sentence.
>Language use, >Situation semantics.
Problem: we need an approach that requires no knowledge of the meaning in the community. - Otherwise everyone would have to understand every sentence.
>Language community, >Understanding.},
note = { Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224181}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224181}
}