@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Ryle,Gilbert},
subject = {Emotions},
note = {I 131
Emotion/Ryle: emotion is not the same as mood. A tingling sensation is tickling, feeling sick is not the same as being sick.
Mood/Ryle: mood is not recognizing, not understanding - but open, from the heart, not the head.
I 137
Emotion/Ryle: it is absurd not to know if you feel better but it is not absurd not to know whether one is healthier now.
I 137
Emotion is not linked with arousal or inclination. Sensations are not intentional.
>Sensation, >Intentionality, >Arousal/Psychology.
I 140
Fantasy (novel) brings real suffering and real tears but spurious indignation.
Delight, relief, sorrow: are signs of feelings, not the feelings themselves.
I 143 f
Emotions/sensations: emotions like itching, tingling, stinging, biting, prickling, drilling, nausea, shock, anxiety and tension are at most accidental explanations for actions.
Mood: is delight, joy, sorrow, longing, nostalgia, passion, excitement, disappointment (even in the absence) and also the mood to like to do something (disposition).
>Disposition.
Mood: is not an experience and not an object of introspection.
>Introspection.
Cf. >Psychological theories on emotion.},
note = { Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224401}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224401}
}