@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Ryle,Gilbert}, subject = {Emotions}, note = {I 131 Emotion/Ryle: emotion is not the same as mood. A tingling sensation is tickling, feeling sick is not the same as being sick. Mood/Ryle: mood is not recognizing, not understanding - but open, from the heart, not the head. I 137 Emotion/Ryle: it is absurd not to know if you feel better but it is not absurd not to know whether one is healthier now. I 137 Emotion is not linked with arousal or inclination. Sensations are not intentional. >Sensation, >Intentionality, >Arousal/Psychology. I 140 Fantasy (novel) brings real suffering and real tears but spurious indignation. Delight, relief, sorrow: are signs of feelings, not the feelings themselves. I 143 f Emotions/sensations: emotions like itching, tingling, stinging, biting, prickling, drilling, nausea, shock, anxiety and tension are at most accidental explanations for actions. Mood: is delight, joy, sorrow, longing, nostalgia, passion, excitement, disappointment (even in the absence) and also the mood to like to do something (disposition). >Disposition. Mood: is not an experience and not an object of introspection. >Introspection. Cf. >Psychological theories on emotion.}, note = { Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224401} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=224401} }