@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Field,Hartry}, subject = {Mental States}, note = {II 84 Mental states/intentionality/Stalnaker: per pragmatic image: belief contents are coarse grained - understandable in terms of the role in the characterization of actions. >Fine-grained/coarse-grained. Field: per linguistic image. >Linguistic view/Field. II 88 Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/Field: we should manage without intrinsically representative mental states. >Mental states, >Representations/Stalnaker. Non-intrinsical representational states: also have content, can be synonymous. - On the other hand intrinsically representative: E.g. object of believe as an ordered triple from Caesar, Rubicon, Cross. II 89 Possible world/sets of worlds/Field: what is relevant for sets of possible worlds as objects of mental states is that they form a Boolean algebra. >Possible worlds, >Possible worlds/Field. II 100 Intentionality/FieldVsStalnaker: we need more than the atomistic approach that everything that satisfies a Boolean algebra is sufficient for the explanation of mental states. (Via sets of possible worlds). >Intentionality. Instead: we need a systematic of the connection of content. - Therefore, we need a more fine-grained structure than that of sets of possible worlds. Cf. >Hyperintensionality.}, note = { Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=225688} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=225688} }