@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Rorty,Richard}, subject = {Mental States}, note = {Rorty I 28 Wittgenstein, Strawson: there is nothing but the human body, VsDescartes. >Dualism, >Monism, >Cartesianism. Non-spatiality is not a clear criterion for a mental state, because the concept of the state is so unclear, neither spatial nor non-spatial. >Materialism, >Physicalism, >Functionalism. I 77f Ryle: opinions, wishes and feelings (traits of reason and character) can be thought of as something that requires the human itself as a substrate, and not a non-material medium. This is more difficult with sensations, mental images and thoughts. >Beliefs, >Desire, >Emotions, >Thoughts, >Thought objects, >Objects of belief, >Psychological theories on personality traits. I 77ff State: this above argument makes it so easy to consider sensations, etc. not as states of things, but rather as things themselves. (RortyVs). This allows some contemporary philosophers to afford mental things without a soul. Cf. >Mental objects/AI research. I 80 Def Neutral monism: considers the mental and the material as two "aspects" of an underlying reality. - Reality accessible with intuition (Bergson). Reality also to be identified with the material and the perception (Russell, Ayer). The only way to escape skepticism. (Dewey, James). >Skepticism, >Skepticism/James, >Bergson. I 106f RortyVs: you cannot find a "neutral material" which is neither mental nor physical, and has its own powers and dispositions. Therefore, you simply postulate it. But that does not help. >Substance, >Substratum. - - - Frank I 581 Mental/Rorty: a) Events: sensations, thoughts, etc. b) states that are no events: opinions, moods, intentions, etc. >Intentions, >Intentionality, >Sensation, >Event, >State. Richard Rorty (I970b) : Incorrigibility as th e Mark of the Mental, in: The Journal of Philosophy 67 (1970), 399-424 - - - Rorty I 60 Idea/mind/Antiquity/Rorty: antiquity had no concept of the mental and no concept of a mind separated from the body - no concept of idea - no concept of consciousness. >Ancient philosophy. Idea: new with Locke - this only makes epistemology possible. >Idea/Locke, >Ideas. I 117 Mind/mental/RortyVsRyle: Ryle believed to have avoided the image of the mirror, but he failed in the attempt to prove that there are no uncorrectable reports. >Mental states/Ryle, >Ryle, >Incorrigibility.}, note = { Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=225731} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=225731} }