@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Chisholm,Roderick}, subject = {Identity}, note = {I 37 Identity/Anscombe: difference: e.g. Descartes doubts the identity with Descartes/with Descartes himself. >He/He himself. It is something different for Descartes to doubt the identity of Descartes with Descartes, than the identity of his own with Descartes. -> S. Kripke in: M.Frank, Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins, Frankfurt/M. 1994, p. 125. Anscombe: then it is possible that one does not know that he speaks of himself. E.g. The tallest man may not know that he is the tallest man. I 69 Identity/I/Chisholm: results from direct attribution; if x directly assigns something to y, then x is identical with y. Everyone has privileged access - but we do not explain it by the use of I, but vice versa: the use of the pronoun by direct attribution. - primary use of I am: someone says of himself that he himself ... - pronoun: does not express any part of the content. >Attribution.}, note = { Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=231006} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=231006} }