@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Wiggins,David},
subject = {Identity},
note = {II 289f
Identity/Wiggins: Problem: from
(1)(x)(y)(x = y)> (Fx ↔ Fy)),
(2)(x)(y)[(x = y)> (N(x = x) ↔ N (y = x))]
and the superfluous
(3)N(x = x)
should follow: (
4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)].
II 292
Problem: (4) does not work in opaque contexts e.g. to be taken for Jekyll and not immediately for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde.
>Opacity.
Identity/possible world/Kripke: E.g. Supposing Hesperus would not be Phosphorus. Okay, but Phosphorus is Phosphorus. And besides, Hesperus is Phosphorus. So if H would not be P, P would not be P.
WigginsVsKripke: yes but certainly not if H would not be P? This does not work as easily as Kripke wants it to work.
>Possible worlds, >Saul A. Kripke.
---
Simons I 115
Identity/extensionality/Wiggins: E.g. Tibbles whole cat, consists of Tib(body) and tail (tail).
>Tibbles-Example.
N.B.: if no accident happens, one must still distinguish the whole (individual cat) from the sum (Tib + Tail). Although they consist of the same parts - Sum: can be split.
Process: cannot be split.
>Process.
There is a difference in modality de re - despite coincidence as four-dimensional object.
>Modalities, >de re, >Four-dimensionalism.
Therefore QuineVsModality de re.
Here sum and process differ, although they coincide as four-dimensional objects.
>Mereological sum.},
note = { Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976
Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 },
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=231076}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=231076}
}