@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Wiggins,David}, subject = {Identity}, note = {II 289f Identity/Wiggins: Problem: from (1)(x)(y)(x = y)> (Fx ↔ Fy)), (2)(x)(y)[(x = y)> (N(x = x) ↔ N (y = x))] and the superfluous (3)N(x = x) should follow: ( 4)(x)(y)[(x = y)> N(y = x)]. II 292 Problem: (4) does not work in opaque contexts e.g. to be taken for Jekyll and not immediately for Hyde, although Jekyll = Hyde. >Opacity. Identity/possible world/Kripke: E.g. Supposing Hesperus would not be Phosphorus. Okay, but Phosphorus is Phosphorus. And besides, Hesperus is Phosphorus. So if H would not be P, P would not be P. WigginsVsKripke: yes but certainly not if H would not be P? This does not work as easily as Kripke wants it to work. >Possible worlds, >Saul A. Kripke. --- Simons I 115 Identity/extensionality/Wiggins: E.g. Tibbles whole cat, consists of Tib(body) and tail (tail). >Tibbles-Example. N.B.: if no accident happens, one must still distinguish the whole (individual cat) from the sum (Tib + Tail). Although they consist of the same parts - Sum: can be split. Process: cannot be split. >Process. There is a difference in modality de re - despite coincidence as four-dimensional object. >Modalities, >de re, >Four-dimensionalism. Therefore QuineVsModality de re. Here sum and process differ, although they coincide as four-dimensional objects. >Mereological sum.}, note = { Wiggins I D. Wiggins Essays on Identity and Substance Oxford 2016 Wiggins II David Wiggins "The De Re ’Must’: A Note on the Logical Form of Essentialist Claims" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Simons I P. Simons Parts. A Study in Ontology Oxford New York 1987 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=231076} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=231076} }