@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Frege,Gottlob}, subject = {Content}, note = {Berka I 85 Content/Frege: content is the function of an argument. A concept is formed in the following way: the subject is the argument and the predicate is the function. >Subject, >Predicate, >Function. Berka I 86 Not every content can be assessed: e.g. the idea/concept of a house. >Judgment, >Imagination, >Negation. Berka I 87 Affirmation/Frege: affirmation refers to the whole of content and judgment. Berka I 88 Against: negation/denial: negation is part of the content, not of the judgment. Berka I 87 Def Conceptual Content/Frege/(s): conceptual content is common to passive and active. ((s) From which the same set of conclusions can be drawn.) This has nothing to do with the distinction function/argument. Berka I 96 Content Identity/Frege: content identity differs from the contingency (implication) in that it refers to names, not to contents. Two names have the same content. >Proper names. Problem: characters can sometimes stand for themselves, sometimes they stand for a content. E.g. in geometry, the same point can have different meanings. Therefore, you must use two different names first to show this later. Different names are not a mere formality. Spelling: with a triple bar ≡. This refers to conceptual content. Also content identity needs its own character, because the same content can be determined differently.(1) 1. G. Frege, Begriffsschrift, eine der arithmetischen nachgebildete Formelsprache des reinen Denkens, Halle 1879, Neudruck in: Ders. Begriffsschrift und andere Aufsätze, hrsg. v. J. Agnelli, Hildesheim 1964 - - - Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 Content/Frege: content is intension, a way of givenness. >Intensions, >Way of givenness. II 57ff Content/sentence/Frege: content can be true or false.}, note = { F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Berka I Karel Berka Lothar Kreiser Logik Texte Berlin 1983 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=233906} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=233906} }