@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Cresswell,Maxwell J.}, subject = {Intensional Objects}, note = {I 115 Defensive object/Cresswell: is an object which is a different thing (or several things) in different possible worlds. >Possible worlds, >Cross word identity, cf. >Counterparts, >Counterpart theory. Hintikka: better: game theory as a solution for identity in intensional contexts - whereby the first player tries, to make the proposition true, and the second to make it false. >Game-theoretical semantics. CresswellVsHintikka: the examples should be better understood in this way that they include normal quantification, but above entities of higher order, e.g. classes of individuals. >Quantification, >Levels (Order). I 120 Intensional objects/Cresswell: a) new in every possible world b) always from the actual world. >Actualism, >Actuality. CresswellVs: instead with Russell: predicate S: "is the largest wooden building" - then disambiguate: (13) (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y) ). Nφy). ((s) There is only one most beautiful and that is necessary wooden) (14) N (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y).φy)- ((s) There is neccessarily only one most beautiful and that is wooden (14), although both are wrong only (14) fails because the uniqueness of S is not logically guaranteed.) Solution: the following is true instead of (14): (15) (E1x) (Xs. N ((E1x) Sx> (Ey)(x)((Sx ⇔ x = y) . φy)) N.B.: but the data of these variables are normal things, not intensional objects. I 122 ff Intensional objects/Cresswell: Problem. E.g. (18) It is true in the other possible world that the largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere is wooden in the other world (19) O (Ey)(x)((Sx ⇔ x = y) . Oφy) (19) is not equivalent to (20) (Ey) (x) ((Sx ⇔ x = y) .φy) - because (19) is wrong in w1 because the thing that is the largest wooden building in w2 is not wooden in w1 (20) is true, however, because the largest wooden building in any possible world is, of course, in this (s) same possible world) wooden. Intensional object: according to this view we should treat the description "The largest wooden building of the southern hemisphere" as a name - then we must consider the form of (18) as (21) OOφs. But OOφs is equivalent to φs, whatever an intensional object is attributed to s. Therefore the meaning of (18) expressed by (19) cannot be captured by (21). Complex property: "in the other world wooden". >Modal properties, >Cross world identity.}, note = { Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=234782} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=234782} }