@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Fodor,Jerry},
subject = {Intentionality},
note = {Dennett I 599
Searle/Fodor: e.g. a freezing robot (Dennett): this robot does not have a correct intentionality, only an as-if intentionality. >As-if intentionality.
Dennett: this is a distinction without reference.
---
Fodor IV 14
Intentionality/holism/Fodor/Lepore: property T*: a belief only has this property when it expresses a proposition that the content of one or another belief is by me. E.g. if someone asks about a color, you will first think of red.
Problem: if we have biographically different thoughts, it may turn out that none of your thoughts has property T* in relation to my thoughts. Then only one of us could have thoughts about color and red.
Another problem: a change of opinion and of beliefs could not be explained. >Colour.
VsIntentional Laws: Quine, Dennett, Davidson, Churchlands, Stich.
IV 127f
Belief is not a basic concept in the theory of intentionality. Instead: representations are a basic concept.
IV 130
Intentional attribution: an intentional assignment is not limited by rationality, because representations may also be irrational (inconsistent) or fantastic. >Attribution, >Representation, >Rationality, >Deceptions.
Fodor/Lepore Vs: that would be a change of subject, irrational propositional attitudes would be no intentional states. >Irrationality.
Constitutive of belief: rationality: not at the same time that p and that not-p, but objects of intentional states may be contradictory. >Objects, >Thinking.},
note = { F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995
Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor IV Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Oxford GB/Cambridge USA 1992 },
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url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=235013}
}