@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Dennett,Daniel},
subject = {Interpretation},
note = {I 237
Artifact/interpretation/Game of Life/Conway/Dennett: Question: are the "Eater", "Glider", etc. designed objects or natural formations? The easiest Glider arises obviously from the rules, no one had to make it. ((s) >Game of Life/Conway; Cf. > Objet ambigu, Paul Valéry).
---
Fodor IV 137
Interpretation theory/Dennett/Fodor/Lepore: (Brentano: Thesis: The intentional cannot be reduced to the physical).
Dennett: i.e. ontologically, there are no such things as belief, desires, intentional phenomena!
Interpretation: they are, however, indispensable as elements of interpretation (epistemic). ((s) That is, that intentionality (or its attribution) is accessible only by interpretation. ("Interpretivism", "interpretativism")).
IV 138
Intentional attribution/Dennett: intentional attribution is always wrong. Because there is no intentionality which is ontological (merely as epistemically useful concepts), Vs intentional realism.
>Attribution.
Principle of Charity/Fodor/Lepore: must be intrinsically holistic, which is also accepted by Dennett.
>Principle of Charity.
Interpretation theory:/Fodor/Lepore: according to Dennett, there are two schools:
1. Def Projectivism/Dennett: one ascribes to the other the internal states that one would have oneself in the appropriate circumstances.
2. Def Normativism/Dennett: one ascribes to the other internal states which he should have in the circumstances.
IV 139
There are, of course, close relations between normativism and holism.
>Holism.},
note = { Dennett I D. Dennett Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995 German Edition: Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997 Dennett II D. Dennett Kinds of Minds, New York 1996 German Edition: Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999 Dennett III Daniel Dennett "COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots" In Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996 Dennett IV Daniel Dennett "Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 },
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}