@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Brandom,Robert}, subject = {Intersubjectivity}, note = {I 823 BrandomVs I-We conceptions of social practices: they do not meet the adequacy condition. They base a distinction between what individuals deem to be correct use and the actually correct use on the comparison of the views of individuals and society. (VsInter-subjectivity) This is the usual way of treating objectivity as inter-subjectivity. >Objectivity. I 831 I-You style: the definitions are made by an individual (account holder), not by "the community". (definition is more than mere regularity) . VsIntersubjectivity (I-We style) it is faulty, because it is unable to grant the possibility of error on the part of the privileged perspective. I 832 I-You conception of intersubjectivity: no perspective is privileged. Perspective form instead of cross-perspective content. >Content.}, note = { Bra I R. Brandom Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994 German Edition: Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000 Bra II R. Brandom Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001 German Edition: Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=235552} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=235552} }