@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Ryle,Gilbert},
subject = {Introspection},
note = {I 208f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: introspection cannot be what the tradition expects of it as its object is a myth.
Consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same nature as what I can find out about others - the small differences just do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel).
>Self-knowledge, >Authority of the First Person, >Priviledged access, >Incorrigibility, >Self-consciousness, >Consciousness.
I 216
RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any symptoms inside - such events do not exist.
I 221 f
Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: there are no ghostly objects but suppose there were, then there is a regress: one would perceive then at the same time, that one perceives them.
>Regress.
Bad solution: then one would have to admit that there are imperceptible inner objects - a knowledge about it could not be based on introspection.
>Mental objects, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism.},
note = { Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=235834}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=235834}
}