@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Ryle,Gilbert}, subject = {Introspection}, note = {I 208f Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: introspection cannot be what the tradition expects of it as its object is a myth. Consciousness: what I can find out about me is of the same nature as what I can find out about others - the small differences just do not favor self-knowledge (RyleVsNagel). >Self-knowledge, >Authority of the First Person, >Priviledged access, >Incorrigibility, >Self-consciousness, >Consciousness. I 216 RyleVsTradition: we do not encounter any symptoms inside - such events do not exist. I 221 f Introspection/RyleVsIntrospection/Ryle: there are no ghostly objects but suppose there were, then there is a regress: one would perceive then at the same time, that one perceives them. >Regress. Bad solution: then one would have to admit that there are imperceptible inner objects - a knowledge about it could not be based on introspection. >Mental objects, >Objects of thought, >Objects of belief, >Mentalism.}, note = { Ryle I G. Ryle The Concept of Mind, Chicago 1949 German Edition: Der Begriff des Geistes Stuttgart 1969 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=235834} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=235834} }