@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Hume,David}, subject = {Causality}, note = {Armstrong II 122 Causal Relation/Hume/tradition/Armstrong: in general, one assumes that the separateness is secured through that A and B are separated by any description, if it was not be self-contradictory, if A exists and B not. II 125 Place himself has rejected that 40 years ago, namely the view that two logically different descriptions cannot refer to one and the same thing. Order: distinctiveness of descriptions/of objects. Solution: we have to assume three entities here: hardness and inelasticity ((s) because its relative to partners). --- Danto I 307 Causality/cause/effect/Hume/Danto: there are in addition to eventual causal links still logical links because the various ideas are not randomly together in the mind. >Mind/Hume, >Ideas/Hume, >Association. --- Hume I 15 Causality/Hume: causality is affect! It is also an impression of self-awareness and an effect of similarity. The notion of causality is one with the notion of things. >Concepts, >Similarity. I 71 Causality/Hume: causality does not arise from probability (this may have to be determined at each stage of the habit) but from gradual observation. >Observation, >Probability. I 74 Its true content cannot be constituted in experience because it itself constitutes the experience. I 75 Ideas need to have a different context than mere individual events. Otherwise there is no inference from effect to cause. Solution: habit as a principle. Habits requires experience. >Experience, >Events, >Effect, >Cause/Hume. I 146 Causality/Hume: causality is the only relation, from which one can conclude. Experience is thereby purely selective and constitutive. Conclusion: the habit changes the level. >Description levels, >Levels. I 152 Causality literally stands for the property.}, note = { Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Danto I A. C. Danto Connections to the World - The Basic Concepts of Philosophy, New York 1989 German Edition: Wege zur Welt München 1999 Danto III Arthur C. Danto Nietzsche as Philosopher: An Original Study, New York 1965 German Edition: Nietzsche als Philosoph München 1998 Danto VII A. C. Danto The Philosophical Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia Classics in Philosophy) New York 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=237801} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=237801} }