@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Putnam,Hilary}, subject = {Mind Body Problem}, note = {IV 146ff Mind Body Problem/Leib-Seele-Problem/Putnam: you can no longer see the mind body problem as a real theoretical problem. A "solution" would not throw the least light on the world. The identity of logical and structural states of machines is also not important at all - even if everything is accurate, it would only be a discovery about the language. IV 147 Mind Body Problem: it is the question whether or not mental events can be identified with physical events in connection with it. >Identity theory, >Type/Token identity, >Type/Token, >Token-physicalism. Question: can a logical analogue be constructed? Carnap: partially interpreted calculation: machine: state A, when flip-flop circuit 36 is on. Theoretical Language: for the machine: "flip-flop circuit 36 is on." Observation Language: for the machine: "I am in state A". Here, the theoretical language is partially interpreted by the observation language. >Observation language, >Interpretation, cf. >Theoretical term. IV 148 Putnam: thesis: all considerations for or against the identification of body and mind can be parallelized with considerations for or against the finding that state A is actually identical to the flip-flop circuit 36 being on. State A : is directly observable. Flip-flop circuit: the flip-flop circuit can only be determined indirectly via highly complicated conclusions. (1) "synthetic" statement: "I am in state A exactly when the flip-flop circuit is 36 on". (2) also synthetic: "I have pain exactly when my C fibers are irritated." IV 148/149 A synthetic statement cannot have an identity, otherwise it would be analytical. >Analyticity/syntheticity. This traditional argumentation for dualism does not use "bare facts of direct experience" at all, but is a complicated train of thought that includes: a) an objectification of universals (properties, states, events) and b) a sharp analytical/synthetic distinction. >Dualism.}, note = { Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf, Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=243489} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=243489} }