@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Schiffer,Stephen}, subject = {Mentalese}, note = {I 73 Meaning in Mentalese determines meaning in public language, but not vice versa (on the content of thoughts). Fodor: we must see intentional properties of mental states as inherited from the semantic properties of the mental representations, which are implied in their tokening. Neural state: also exists if false. - There is no object, since with truth value. Schiffer: is still no system, not yet like a language. Harman: thesis: inner representations have sentence-like structure. >Mental representation. Lewis: language of the brain of synaptic connections and neuronal fires -> SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought). Other thesis: semantic properties are inherited from intentional properties. - (VsStrong thesis of a language of thought). Strong thesis of a language of thought Vs: short/(s): mental representation determines intentionality. Tthis can be explained without public content. SchifferVs: that cannot be fulfilled. I 76 Mentalese/relation theory/Schiffer: which relation of sentences is there in Mentalese to sentences in English? >Relation theory. Problem: the mental sentence "s" cannot be specified by meaning in English (that would be circular). Also Vs core thesis of the strong thesis of a language of thought (semantic properties of the public language are inherited from intentional properties of mental states). >Mental states. I 282 Mentalese/Schiffer: meaning is here not a question of convention and intention - unlike public language. >Convention, >Intention, >Everyday language. Solution/some authors: conceptual role (c.r.) in Mentalese. >Conceptual role. Public language: here sentences have a conceptual role only if they are also thought, not only spoken. Problem: we need a non-semantic relation between mental representation and public sentences. - Fortunately the inner code needs not to be mentioned here. E.g. "state with the same content". Problem: the speaker could believe a sentence only under additional assumptions. - This only with reference to content. - That does not work in a strong thesis of a language of thought. Conclusion: a neural sentence cannot be accepted without reference to the content as an object of belief. >Objects of belief, >Content. I 78 Mentalese/Schiffer: Relation theory requires complex properties, F which has everything; E.g. "flounders snore". Problem: we must not presuppose anything about the intentional properties of mental states or meaning in public language. I 79 Mentalese/Relation theory/belief/Fodor/Schiffer: for the attribution of truth values from situations to sentences: for this purpose, properties are used at the end of the causal chain. >Relation theory. Problem: quantification via properties as semantic values ultimately goes via propositions. >Propositions, >Quantification. Solution: SLT (strong thesis of a language of thought) can use propositions together with conceptual roles for the individuation of content. - Truth values by M-function to possible situations - additional physical condition C. Problem: this approach needs the theory of representation - (in which mental representation is only a special case). Truth conditions: formula: a is the truth condition for s in x' inner code if under optimal conditions x s believes if and only if a exists. - So we can identify a pattern of neuronal firing with the display of a fly for a frog. Problem: only under optimal conditions. SchifferVsFodor: then everyone is omniscient and infallible. I 87 Mentalese/Charity Principle/Schiffer: the charity principle is not for mentalism - this would have to be explained in terms of propositions. I 83-90 Relation theory/Mentalese/Schiffer: Problem: competing attribution functions for truth conditions ("M functions") - wrong solution: "larger survival value" does not exclude wrong attribution functions - e.g. weight/mass. I 189 SLT/strong thesis of a language of thought/Mentalese/Schiffer: thesis 1. the brain is a computer, we are information-processing systems with an inner neural code. Schiffer: I can agree with that. 2. there is a computational relation R for every belief that one can have, so that one has this belief iff one has R for this formula. Schiffer: that works, but only with substitutional quantification. E.g. "Nodnol si yggof": Mentalese for London is foggy. Then the sentence means that, but is not compositional. N.B.: then the content of belief cannot be reduced. - (SchifferVsReductionism) - ((s) Mental content is irreducible (Schiffer pro Brentano). E.g. knowledge-how cannot be analyzed in other terms - there is no fact that makes that something is this faith - + + >Knowing-how, >Nonfactualism.}, note = { Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=246936} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=246936} }