@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Armstrong,David M.}, subject = {Microstructure}, note = {Place I 29 Microstructure/PlaceVsArmstrong: this state that the particular exists and is the reference of the counterfactual conditional, and is its truth maker is not the same state, however, as the microstructure of the particular, as Armstrong believes - although the existence of the microstructure is the "ultimate truth-maker". >Truthmakers. Place I 30 The dispositional property (as an effect of the microstructure) is not the reference of the counterfactual conditional. >Counterfactual Conditional. Place I 29 Dispositional Property/PlaceVsArmstrong: are not the identical with microstructure: 1) Hume: causally relativized things must be separated - 2) linguistically different specified. Microstructure: examine parts - dispositional property: submit the whole thing to a test. >Dispositions. - - - II (b) 39 Microstructure with disposition: contingent identification - unlike a posteriori identification: heat with molecular motion: necessary E.g. identity Genes/DNA: by definition causal role. >Necessity a posteriori. - - - Place II 58 Microstructure/Place: wrong: that the breaking was caused by hitting plus microstructure. Place II 60 Dispositional Properties/Place: consist in their possible past and future manifestations - Microstructure/Place: are categorical properties. Place II 62 PlaceVsArmstong: there is a causal relation between a dispositional property and its microstructural base - ArmstrongVsPlace: he cannot allow that, because he has according to Hume to accept a separation between the two.}, note = { Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place II U. T. Place A Conceptualist Ontology In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place III U. T. Place Structural Properties: Categorical, Dispositional, or both? In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place IV U. T. Place Conceptualism and the Ontological Independence of Cause and Effect In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Place V U. T. Place Identifying the Mind: Selected Papers of U. T. Place Oxford 2004 Place I U. T. Place Dispositions as Intentional States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=248086} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=248086} }