@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Cresswell,Maxwell J.},
subject = {Possible World Semantics},
note = {I 99
Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: Advantage: allows quantification in belief contexts.
>Opacity, >Quantification into belief context.
II 72
Definition true/truth/semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: a sentence is true in a possible world iff this world is in the set of worlds, which is its intension (of the sentence).
>Intensions, >Extensions.
Cresswell: therefore it can be said that the extension of the theorem is its truth value.
>Truth Value/Frege.
II 163
Possible World Semantics/possible world/FieldVsPossible World Semantics/Cresswell: (Field 1978(1), 40) the use of possible worlds binds someone to a general concept of synonymy.
>Synonymy.
II 163
Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: allows an immediate access to terms such as entailment and inconsistency. That is, meaning postulates are superfluous.
>Meaning postulates.
II 164
Def Entailment/Possible World Semantics: is simply the class inclusion in the set of possible worlds.
>Entailment.
Def contradiction: something that is true in no possible world.
>Contradictions, >Impossible worlds.
1. Field, H. 1978. Mental Representation. In: Erkenntnis 13. Reprinted in Block 1981, pp. 9-61.},
note = { Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=249101}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=249101}
}