@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Cresswell,Maxwell J.}, subject = {Possible World Semantics}, note = {I 99 Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: Advantage: allows quantification in belief contexts. >Opacity, >Quantification into belief context. II 72 Definition true/truth/semantics of possible worlds/Cresswell: a sentence is true in a possible world iff this world is in the set of worlds, which is its intension (of the sentence). >Intensions, >Extensions. Cresswell: therefore it can be said that the extension of the theorem is its truth value. >Truth Value/Frege. II 163 Possible World Semantics/possible world/FieldVsPossible World Semantics/Cresswell: (Field 1978(1), 40) the use of possible worlds binds someone to a general concept of synonymy. >Synonymy. II 163 Possible World Semantics/Cresswell: allows an immediate access to terms such as entailment and inconsistency. That is, meaning postulates are superfluous. >Meaning postulates. II 164 Def Entailment/Possible World Semantics: is simply the class inclusion in the set of possible worlds. >Entailment. Def contradiction: something that is true in no possible world. >Contradictions, >Impossible worlds. 1. Field, H. 1978. Mental Representation. In: Erkenntnis 13. Reprinted in Block 1981, pp. 9-61.}, note = { Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=249101} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=249101} }