@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Black, Max}, subject = {Naturalistic Fallacy}, note = {III 81 Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume: there are quite sentences with "should", which can have a trith value - then there is no logical separation of scientific and moral principles. (Original place: D. Hume, Treatise of human Nature, book 3, part I sec. 1) Black: the argument is deceptively simple: Hume/Black: all moralists make an imperceptible transition from observations of human affairs (or assertions about the existence of God) expressed with "is" and "is not" to normative conclusions with "should" or "should not". But this transition does not follow at all ("is of the least consequence"). We need a reason why this new relation (which seems unthinkable) could occur as a deduction from others. Deduction/Hume/naturalistic fallacy/Black: the core of the argument is that nothing can follow in a deduction that is not already contained in the premises. Naturalistic fallacy/BlackVsHume: but there is a way in which new evaluative or normative material can appear in a valid conclusion: For example, premise: you can't make an omelette without breaking eggs. (This can be regarded as factual) But it follows now: Conclusion: if you want to make an omelette, eggs should be broken. Hume/Black: what he means is that no categorical or unconditional "should" follows. BlackVsHume: this seems convincing at first sight. But: Problem: the absence of the word "should" is not a reliable criterion. For example, the conclusion that murder is a sin implies that one should not kill. But how can we judge from the mere linguistic form that the premise is not normative. One could say that the sentence about murder is unverifiable. III 81 Behind this are difficult questions of how we should understand the goals and procedures of science. >Science/Black.}, note = { Black I Max Black "Meaning and Intention: An Examination of Grice’s Views", New Literary History 4, (1972-1973), pp. 257-279 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979 Black II M. Black The Labyrinth of Language, New York/London 1978 German Edition: Sprache. Eine Einführung in die Linguistik München 1973 Black III M. Black The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983 Black IV Max Black "The Semantic Definition of Truth", Analysis 8 (1948) pp. 49-63 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=250647} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=250647} }