@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Stalnaker,Robert},
subject = {Propositions},
note = {I 35
Proposition/structure/possible world/Stalnaker: propositions are highly structured, possible worlds are not.
>Possible worlds/Stalnaker.
The structures that exist between propositions, do not exist like that between possible worlds. Propositions can be stronger or weaker - possible worlds cannot.
>Stronger/weaker, >Content, >Situations, >World.
A minimum theory of propositions and possible worlds needs only the structures of propositions, not of possible worlds.
>Structures.
I 37
Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is made up of individuals and properties. Sentence/Stalnaker: a sentence is made up of names and predicates.
>Sentences, >Predication, >Truth.
I 51
Understanding/Stalnaker: a proposition cannot be understood like a sentence, because it is already the content.
>Understanding.
I 61f
Def Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is no more than a sub-region, or subset of possible worlds. Def assertion: asserting a proposition is nothing else than to locate the real world in this subset.
>Assertions, >Logical space.
Def true-relative-to-x: to say, a proposition is true relative to a possible world x means that the possible world x is in the subset (of possible worlds) that constitutes the proposition.
Def true simpliciter: is to say that the real world is in this subset (of possible worlds that constitute the proposition).
>Bare truth.
Proposition: a proposition is identified with its truth conditions.
>Truth conditions, >Individuation.
I 191
Secondary proposition/two-dimensional semantics/Chalmers/Stalnaker: ("fx"): secondary propositions are based on the real world.
>Intensions/Stalnaker.
Primary proposition: ("fp"): primary propositions are based on the particular world in which the statement is made. Logical form: Def fp: logical Form: fx(y) = f(x,y) and fp(x) = f(x,x) or equivalent: fp(x) = fx(x).},
note = { Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=257153}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=257153}
}