@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Stalnaker,Robert}, subject = {Propositions}, note = {I 35 Proposition/structure/possible world/Stalnaker: propositions are highly structured, possible worlds are not. >Possible worlds/Stalnaker. The structures that exist between propositions, do not exist like that between possible worlds. Propositions can be stronger or weaker - possible worlds cannot. >Stronger/weaker, >Content, >Situations, >World. A minimum theory of propositions and possible worlds needs only the structures of propositions, not of possible worlds. >Structures. I 37 Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is made up of individuals and properties. Sentence/Stalnaker: a sentence is made up of names and predicates. >Sentences, >Predication, >Truth. I 51 Understanding/Stalnaker: a proposition cannot be understood like a sentence, because it is already the content. >Understanding. I 61f Def Proposition/Stalnaker: a proposition is no more than a sub-region, or subset of possible worlds. Def assertion: asserting a proposition is nothing else than to locate the real world in this subset. >Assertions, >Logical space. Def true-relative-to-x: to say, a proposition is true relative to a possible world x means that the possible world x is in the subset (of possible worlds) that constitutes the proposition. Def true simpliciter: is to say that the real world is in this subset (of possible worlds that constitute the proposition). >Bare truth. Proposition: a proposition is identified with its truth conditions. >Truth conditions, >Individuation. I 191 Secondary proposition/two-dimensional semantics/Chalmers/Stalnaker: ("fx"): secondary propositions are based on the real world. >Intensions/Stalnaker. Primary proposition: ("fp"): primary propositions are based on the particular world in which the statement is made. Logical form: Def fp: logical Form: fx(y) = f(x,y) and fp(x) = f(x,x) or equivalent: fp(x) = fx(x).}, note = { Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=257153} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=257153} }