@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Chisholm,Roderick}, subject = {Psychology}, note = {II 211ff Purely mental/Marek: disposition: content determined only by experience - not purely psych: e.g. homesick - e.g. perceptual judgment: car is 5 m long. >Dispositions, >Mental states. II 213 Psychology/analytical philosophy/Marek: Question: Is the concept of the psychic uniform? One can speak of things that are psychic: e.g. properties, qualities, phenomena, states, events. And you can say of concepts and theories that they are not psychic. II 214 Question: are there purely logical features characteristic of the psychic? Brentano: yes, intentionality. >Intentionality. Other authors VsBrentano: The search for characteristics is in vain, since the psychic is not further definable. E.G., just as one cannot give specific species characteristics for the concept of the phenomenal color. At the most, one can specify subspecies (for the color as for the psychic). II 212/3 Difference: pain is something unpleasant - pain is something mental (mention/use). >Use, >Mention. Marek, Johann Christian. Zum Programm einer Deskriptiven Psychologie. In: Philosophische Ausätze zu Ehren Roderick M. Chisholm Marian David/ Leopold Stubenberg (Hg), Amsterdam 1986}, note = { Chisholm I R. Chisholm The First Person. Theory of Reference and Intentionality, Minneapolis 1981 German Edition: Die erste Person Frankfurt 1992 Chisholm II Roderick Chisholm In Philosophische Aufsäze zu Ehren von Roderick M. Ch, Marian David/Leopold Stubenberg, Amsterdam 1986 Chisholm III Roderick M. Chisholm Theory of knowledge, Englewood Cliffs 1989 German Edition: Erkenntnistheorie Graz 2004 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=258201} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=258201} }