@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Searle,John R.}, subject = {Realism}, note = {II 87 Realism, naive/SearleVs: naive realism is right that the material objects and experiences are the typical objects of perception. But the realism overlooks the fact that they can only be it because perception has an intentional content. II 199 Realism/Searle: realism has no hypothesis or belief, realism belongs to the background. >Terminology/Searle. I am set to the background. Realism is a prerequisite for hypotheses and being determined to realism itself is not a hypothesis. - - - III 160f External Realism/Searle: external realism must still differ between representation-independent (e.g. stars) and mind-independent (also stars), e.g. pain is representation-independent but not mind-independent. Cf. >Internal realism. III 165 Realism/Searle: thesis: realism says that there is an independent reality, not about how it is designed, no theory of language, no theory of representation, but ontological. III 163f Realism/Searle: realism should not be confused with the correspondence theory, it is no theory of truth but a condition for our hypotheses. It is compatible with any truth theory because it is a theory of ontology and not the meaning of "true". There is no semantic theory. Putnam understands realism epistemically: the realism asserts that it would be reasonable to assume a divine standpoint. SearleVsPutnam: accepting a mistake that reality determines itself what vocabulary is appropriate. III 165 Searle: realism is not a theory of language. VsTradition: N.B.: realism is not a theory about how the world "really" is. Reason: we could be wrong about all the details, and the realism can nevertheless be true. Definition realism/Searle: the view that there is a way of being of the things that is logically independent of all representations, it does not say how things are. III 166 Realism/Searle: arguments against the existence of things are claims about the external reality like any other. They presuppose the realism just as others do. The non-existence of things ((s) "out there") would be a property of that representation-independent reality. III 191 External Realism/Searle: external realism is a condition for understanding other hypotheses. III 193 ff Realism: thesis: realism has no hypothesis, but conditions for any hypotheses. Realism is part of the background. >Background/Searle.}, note = { Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=260701} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=260701} }