@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Rorty,Richard}, subject = {Reference}, note = {I 96 Reference/Rorty: for each distinction between referees of expressions one needs some ontological categories, anything, even coarse to tailor the things. I 317f RortyVsPutnam, RortyVsKripke: If the concept of "really talk about" is confused with the concept of reference, one can easily get the idea like Kripke and Putnam that we had "intuitions" about the reference. Of course, there can be no reference to fictions. This corresponds to the technical-scientific use. But then "reference" has nothing to do with "talk about", and only comes into play after you have made a choice between the interpretive strategies. I 316ff Real questions of existence are also not affected by the criterion of Searle and Strawson. What is then the right criterion? Rorty: there is none at all. I 321 For Davidsons ’pure’ philosophy of language neither one nor the other is necessary. - - - Horwich I 450 Reference/Davidson: is a byproduct of the translation - reference/Kripke: causation must have something to do with reference. Reference/Strawson: you find out what somebody is referring to by finding out for what most of his beliefs are true. Radical interpretation: reconciles the two approaches: Strawson is right when he is understood holistically. Quine: middle position between Kripke and Strawson: knowledge of causation and reference is a matter of the coherence of the beliefs of the natives and the field linguists. Kripke: modular approach: causal paths of objects to speech acts. Then all beliefs can also be wrong. - That means that one does not know what one is referring to. DavidsonVsKripke: this is precisely the gap between conceptual scheme and content. >Conceptual scheme, >Content, >Scheme/content. Solution/Davidson: reversed: first maximize coherence and truth, then reference as a byproduct - then it can be as it likes! - Important argument: This ensures that in the most direct cases the intentional objects are the causes of the beliefs - the Gödel-Schmitt case must then be an exception. >Goedel-Schmidt-case. I 451 Otherwise the term of reference had no content. Radical Interpretation/DavidsonVsKripke: works if we know most of the intentional objects of the native. >Objects of thought, >Intensional objects. Radical Interpretation: begins at home: we assume for ourselves and for the native that most beliefs are true - (I 452 that requires no causality!) Then we have to reject intermediate links "the determined meaning" or "intended interpretation", "imaginations". Meaning/belief/Quine/Davidson: meaning and belief cannot be found out independently of one another. Rorty I 323 Reference Theory/PutnamVscausal reference theory/Putnam/Rorty: a "causal" reference theory cannot help: because the question of how the term "cause" can clearly refer to something is just as enigmatic as the question of how the term "cat" can do it. >Causal Theory of Reference. - - - IV 23 Reference/Reference Theory/Putnam/Rorty: early: only causal theory of reference - not intentional - can spare us from relativism. ((s) Putnam later: non-intentional theory does not explain learning.) >Learning.}, note = { Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 Horwich I P. Horwich (Ed.) Theories of Truth Aldershot 1994 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=261473} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=261473} }