@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Stalnaker,Robert},
subject = {Reference},
note = {I 177
Proposition/sentence/truth/knowledge/identification/Evans: (1982)(1) e.g. Julius is the (rigid) name of the inventor of the zipper (whoever it was) - then "Julius was born in Minsk" expresses a particular proposition about a particular individual, but we do not know who the individual is, i.e. we do not know what proposition is expressed by the sentence.
I 180f
Reference/Stalnaker: we have two images about language and thinking, repsectively, about an object:
a) directly by virtue of a causal relation (Kripke)
>Kripke
b) indirectly through our sensing... (Frege)
>Frege
...and expressions of purely qualitative terms that are instantiated by certain things.
Does this lead to essentialism in Kripke’s opinion?
>Essentialism.
SearleVsMill: direct reference (without an intermediary sense) leads into a metaphysical trap: separation of object and properties.
>Cf. >Properties/Quine.
Solution/Stalnaker: properly understood, it is about the modal properties of a thing. ((s) It could have been different).
>Modal properties.
1. Evans, G. (1982): 'The Varieties of Evidence' (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press), p. 31.},
note = { Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=261482}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=261482}
}