@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Stalnaker,Robert}, subject = {Reference}, note = {I 177 Proposition/sentence/truth/knowledge/identification/Evans: (1982)(1) e.g. Julius is the (rigid) name of the inventor of the zipper (whoever it was) - then "Julius was born in Minsk" expresses a particular proposition about a particular individual, but we do not know who the individual is, i.e. we do not know what proposition is expressed by the sentence. I 180f Reference/Stalnaker: we have two images about language and thinking, repsectively, about an object: a) directly by virtue of a causal relation (Kripke) >Kripke b) indirectly through our sensing... (Frege) >Frege ...and expressions of purely qualitative terms that are instantiated by certain things. Does this lead to essentialism in Kripke’s opinion? >Essentialism. SearleVsMill: direct reference (without an intermediary sense) leads into a metaphysical trap: separation of object and properties. >Cf. >Properties/Quine. Solution/Stalnaker: properly understood, it is about the modal properties of a thing. ((s) It could have been different). >Modal properties. 1. Evans, G. (1982): 'The Varieties of Evidence' (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press), p. 31.}, note = { Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=261482} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=261482} }