@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Schiffer,Stephen}, subject = {Representation}, note = {Graeser I 129 SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a "language of thought". >Language of thoguht, >Sentences, >Content. Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation. >Relation theory. Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there cannot be a sentence-oriented, nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of a conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses. >Meaning, >Judgments. Graeser: thus, we lose the ground under our feet. --- Schiffer I 15 Representations/Schiffer: representations realize mental states- - Mental representations are in mentalese. >Mentalese, >Mental states. I 275 Truth Value/representation: borderline case: propositional attitude as a relation to neural formulas: then belief is a relation to other beliefs. - As representational states beliefs have then truth values, regardless of whether they have a sentence structure. >Truth values, >Beliefs/Schiffer, >Sentences.}, note = { Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=263807} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=263807} }