@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Schiffer,Stephen},
subject = {Representation},
note = {Graeser I 129
SchifferVsRepresentation: the contents of sentences in question cannot be representations, for example, in a "language of thought".
>Language of thoguht, >Sentences, >Content.
Belief/Schiffer: Vs belief as a relation.
>Relation theory.
Meaning/SchifferVsDavidson: if there cannot be a sentence-oriented, nor a non-sentence-oriented analysis of meaning, then also the possibility of a conception of judgmental settings as relations collapses.
>Meaning, >Judgments.
Graeser: thus, we lose the ground under our feet.
---
Schiffer I 15
Representations/Schiffer: representations realize mental states- - Mental representations are in mentalese.
>Mentalese, >Mental states.
I 275
Truth Value/representation: borderline case: propositional attitude as a relation to neural formulas: then belief is a relation to other beliefs. - As representational states beliefs have then truth values, regardless of whether they have a sentence structure.
>Truth values, >Beliefs/Schiffer, >Sentences.},
note = { Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987
Grae I A. Graeser Positionen der Gegenwartsphilosophie. München 2002 Schi I St. Schiffer Remnants of Meaning Cambridge 1987 },
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=263807}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=263807}
}