@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Nozick,Robert},
subject = {Self},
note = {II 61
Identity/time/self/I/Nozick: because it is highly conceptual, a scheme appears to be necessary.
>Identity conditions, cf. >Qua objects.
This scheme should choose between near and immediate successors, etc.
>Next successor/Nozick, >Similarity metrics, >Similarity.
But I do not need the scheme to find out my goals, but to find out whose goals are mine.
>Self-knowledge, >Self-identification.
Problem: who applies actually the scheme?
II 78
Definition I/self/some authors: to be an I or to be self, means to have the ability of reflexive self-reference.
>I, Ego, >Self, >I/Nozick.
NozickVs: 1. This ability must just have existed sometime
2. beings: from the fact that I have this ability, it does not follow that it is essential.
In addition: the reflexive self-reference gives me access to the self, but that does not guarantee that it is part of my nature as self.
>Self-reference.},
note = { No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=265790}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=265790}
}