@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Nozick,Robert}, subject = {Self}, note = {II 61 Identity/time/self/I/Nozick: because it is highly conceptual, a scheme appears to be necessary. >Identity conditions, cf. >Qua objects. This scheme should choose between near and immediate successors, etc. >Next successor/Nozick, >Similarity metrics, >Similarity. But I do not need the scheme to find out my goals, but to find out whose goals are mine. >Self-knowledge, >Self-identification. Problem: who applies actually the scheme? II 78 Definition I/self/some authors: to be an I or to be self, means to have the ability of reflexive self-reference. >I, Ego, >Self, >I/Nozick. NozickVs: 1. This ability must just have existed sometime 2. beings: from the fact that I have this ability, it does not follow that it is essential. In addition: the reflexive self-reference gives me access to the self, but that does not guarantee that it is part of my nature as self. >Self-reference.}, note = { No I R. Nozick Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981 No II R., Nozick The Nature of Rationality 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=265790} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=265790} }