@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Evans,Gareth}, subject = {Self- Ascription}, note = {Frank I 524 Mental self-ascription/Evans: if one ascribes an opinion to oneself, then the view is, so to speak, and often literally is, directed outwards - to the world - we can do without the "inner view". - Mental Self-Ascription is not infallible. >Incorrigibility. I 530 Evans: self-ascription of experience does not require any special skill of an inner sense. - No disposition for cases of correct judgments, that guaranteed infallibility. Information stance: with content: e.g., "as if a thousand tiny needles .." / without content: e.g., "pain", "itching". Gareth Evans(1982): Self-Identification, in: G.Evans The Varieties of Reference, ed. by John McDowell, Oxford/NewYork 1982, 204-266}, note = { EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=266201} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=266201} }