@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024},
author = {Cresswell,Maxwell J.},
subject = {Sense},
note = {II 28
Sense/Cresswell: Here a structure e.g. from individual references of the parts.
"Meaning = structure". (Sensitivity of "that" on the parts of the complement sentence (after "that"); not only on the whole sentence because of the attribution of propositional attitudes that can be wrong when substituted.
>Propositional attitudes, >Substitution.
II 26
That has to do with Frege’s "way of givenness".
>Way of givenness.
II 77
Sense / Cresswell: consists in the structures that are formed from the meanings of the parts - contrary to that: Reference / Cresswell: is the result of the fact that the parts of an expression stand in relation to one another in the way of argument and function.
Reference/(s): should be the simple whole.
>Reference.
Intension: also a simple entity.
Attribution of propositional attitudes/Cresswell: should be sensitive to the structure (parts), not to the intension.
>Intensions, >Attribution.
II 86
Meaning (= structure) is not the same as reference. - Reference: = intension (= "whole").},
note = { Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=267526}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=267526}
}