@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Cresswell,Maxwell J.}, subject = {Sense}, note = {II 28 Sense/Cresswell: Here a structure e.g. from individual references of the parts. "Meaning = structure". (Sensitivity of "that" on the parts of the complement sentence (after "that"); not only on the whole sentence because of the attribution of propositional attitudes that can be wrong when substituted. >Propositional attitudes, >Substitution. II 26 That has to do with Frege’s "way of givenness". >Way of givenness. II 77 Sense / Cresswell: consists in the structures that are formed from the meanings of the parts - contrary to that: Reference / Cresswell: is the result of the fact that the parts of an expression stand in relation to one another in the way of argument and function. Reference/(s): should be the simple whole. >Reference. Intension: also a simple entity. Attribution of propositional attitudes/Cresswell: should be sensitive to the structure (parts), not to the intension. >Intensions, >Attribution. II 86 Meaning (= structure) is not the same as reference. - Reference: = intension (= "whole").}, note = { Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=267526} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=267526} }