@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Barwise,Jon},
subject = {Situation Semantics},
note = {Cresswell II 169
Situation semantics/Barwise/Perry/Cresswell: (Barwise/Perry, 1983)(1): here it is explicitly denied that logically equivalent sentences in contexts with propositional attitudes are interchangeable. (1983(1), 175, 1981b(4), 676f) - e.g. double negation in the attribution of propositional attitudes.
>Equivalence, >Double negation.
Solution: partial character of situations. - Not everything has to be given - or the speaker may have to suspend judgment. ("do not ...").
>Situations.
Def sentence meaning/Barwise/Perry: a relation between situations.
- - -
Cresswell I 63
Situation SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/knowledge/meaning/Barwise/Perry/BarweiseVsCresswell/ PerryVsCresswell/Cresswell: the possible worlds are too big to explain what the speaker knows when he/she utters a meaningful sentence.
Possible worlds: are complete possible situations.
>Possible worlds, >Possible World Semantics.
Situation semantics: we need a more partial type of entity. ((s) partial, not complete).
CresswellVsSituation Semantics: (Cresswell 1985a(2), 168 ff, 1985b(3), Chapter 7)
Solution/Cresswell: Thesis: The situations only have to be partial in the sense that they are small worlds.
Def Abstract Situation/Barwise/Perry: (1983(1), 57 ff): abstract situations are theoretical constructs used for an adequate semantic modeling of reality consisting of real situations.
Cresswell: I ignore this distinction here. The semantics of possible worlds is better here, even if one differentiates between reality and theoretical representation.
>Possible World Semantics.
What we need to compare are abstract situations and worlds.
I 64
Situation-SemanticsVsPossible World Semantics/BarwiseVsCresswell: there are often two propositions, one of which is believed by the person, but the other is not, but both are still true in the same worlds - for example, all logical and mathematical truths - but they are not all known, otherwise there could be no progress.
I 65
CresswellVs: the situations should play roles that cannot be played at the same time.
Solution: Semantics of possible worlds: the roles are played by entities of different kinds.
Solution: Context with space-time specification.
>Context.
False sentences: describe non-actual situations.
I 66
Sentences describe situations in a context - context is itself a situation that provides the listener with time, place, etc.
Interpretation/Barwise: Meaning of sentences in a context.
>Interpretation, >Sentence meaning.
Meaning/CresswellVsSituation Semantics/CresswellVsBarwise/CresswellVsPerry: Meaning: = set of worlds in which they are true.
Problem: Meanings are often equated with proposition, and then there are problems in playing roles that they cannot play at the same time.
I 67
On the other hand, some of the other things that Barwise and Perry ask for from situations behave like worlds!
For example: Mollie barks
e*: = in I, Mollie, yes.
That describes a situation e iff e* < e. ((s) Subset of situations where Mollie barks otherwise? Or where Mollie exists and someone barks?).
Def Generation property/terminology/Cresswell: (generation property): sentences that describe a situation have a situation property ((s) that is part of a set of situations). A sentence ? has the generation property in terms of a context u, iff there is a situation e*, so that
u[[φ]] e iff e* < e.
((s) If there is a sentence that is more general than the sentence "Mollie barks in the space-time situation I" Or: Generation property is the property that embeds the sentence in the context, because proposition as sets of worlds must not be limited to a single situation.)
The sentence φ has the generation property (simpliciter) iff it has it in every context.
Atomic sentence/Barwise/Perry: Thesis: all atomic sentences have the generation property.
>Atomic sentences.
Cresswell: if situations are to be understood as proposition, all sentences should have the generation property. And that is because the generating situation e* can be understood as the proposition expressed by the sentence ? in context u.
In fact, we do not need the other situations at all! We can say that e* is the only situation described by φ in u. But that doesn't matter, because each e* determines the only class of e's, so e* < e, and each class generated by an e* determines that e* uniquely.
1. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1983). Situations and Attitudes. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Edited by John Perry
2. M. J. Cresswell (1985a) Situations and Attitudes. Philosophical Review 94 (2):293
3. M. J. Cresswell (1985b). Structured meanings. MIT Press
4. Jon Barwise & John Perry (1981). Semantic Innocence and Uncompromising Situations. Midwest Studies in Philosophy (1981), 6 : 387
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1981.tb00447.x},
note = { Barw I J. Barwise Situations and Attitudes Chicago 1999
Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 Cr II M. J. Cresswell Structured Meanings Cambridge Mass. 1984 Cr I M. J. Cresswell Semantical Essays (Possible worlds and their rivals) Dordrecht Boston 1988 },
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=268181}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=268181}
}