@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Carnap,Rudolf}, subject = {Skepticism}, note = {Stroud I 170 CarnapVsSkepticism/Sense/Meaningful/Language/Empiricism/Verification/Verificationism/Stroud: Carnap: Thesis: we can only ever understand something or mean something with our expressions if an appropriate sensation is possible for us - if we can determine the truth of the corresponding sentences. - Then we have to determine a sphere within which this is possible. Stroud I 173 Skepticism/Carnap/Stroud: but that does not mean that skepticism is wrong. But: E.g. the sentence: "No one will ever know if __." Here the "__" would have to be filled by an expression which can only be meaningless, because unverifiable - Meaningless: neither true nor false - then the question "Are there external things?" would be pointless, because neither true nor false. - Useful, however: internal questions: questions of existence within an area of ​​knowledge. - Within an area of ​​knowledge: the same sentence can be produced - i.e. the syntax is not decisive. - Sense: something that is true cannot contradict something that is meaningless. - CarnapVsSkepticsm: meaningless as a whole, because unverifiable. Stroud I 179 Descartes: has the same explanation for the truth of skepticism as Carnap for its futility: the lack of verifiability of empirical existence statements. >Existence statements. Stroud I 187 CarnapVsSkepticism: the traditional philosophical skepticism (external) is actually a "practical" question about the choice of linguistic frame (reference system) - Knowledge/Carnap: Two components: 1) Experience - 2) Linguistic frame (reference system), within which we understand the experience. Stroud I 188 The only theoretical question is that about the rules of the system. - Mother Tongue/Carnap: we do not choose it - therefore, it reflects no thesis about the existence of the outside world. - Decision: if we continue to use it. - Problem: because it is a decision there are no objective facts that make it. Stroud I 191 Skepticism/Reference System/StroudVsCarnap: introduces a "we" and experience as something that happens to us - The fact that we exist and have experience cannot just be regarded as an "internal" truth of the thing language. >exterior/interior. Stroud I 193ff StroudVsCarnap: either leads to idealism or to metaphysical realism or to skepticism all three of which he rejects - because of the futility of external questions. >External questions.}, note = { Ca I R. Carnap Die alte und die neue Logik In Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996 Ca II R. Carnap Philosophie als logische Syntax In Philosophie im 20.Jahrhundert, Bd II, A. Hügli/P.Lübcke (Hg), Reinbek 1993 Ca IV R. Carnap Mein Weg in die Philosophie Stuttgart 1992 Ca IX Rudolf Carnap Wahrheit und Bewährung. Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique fasc. 4, Induction et Probabilité, Paris, 1936 In Wahrheitstheorien, Gunnar Skirbekk, Frankfurt/M. 1977 Ca VI R. Carnap Der Logische Aufbau der Welt Hamburg 1998 CA VII = PiS R. Carnap Sinn und Synonymität in natürlichen Sprachen In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Ca VIII (= PiS) R. Carnap Über einige Begriffe der Pragmatik In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Stroud I B. Stroud The Significance of philosophical scepticism Oxford 1984 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=268298} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=268298} }