@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Quine,W.V.O.}, subject = {Language Rules}, note = {Wolf II 245 Language Rules/QuineVs: are only factual practices (naturalistic conception). - - - Quine VII (b) 32 Semantic rules/Quine: (language rules): analyticity: E.g. I do not know if "everything green is expanded" is analytical or not - purported relation between expressions and languages: A statement S is "analytical in terms of the language L". Problem: making this useful for various statements and languages. Problem: Carnap’s rules contain the word "analytic". Solution: predicate "analytical in L0"? Problem: what distinguishes it from the other predicates? - If we explain that, only for L0 and not in general. VII (b) 35 Language rules/Quine: a semantic rule cannot be introduced ad hoc to explain analyticity - there must be a large number of language rules in order to explain each as an element of the set - otherwise this is circular, because it is only explicable in terms of analyticity (the explanation purpose). >Analyticity. E.g. postulate: who can say what true statements have the rank of postulates if there is only one single postulate, and not a set, in terms of which a postulate may be an element or not - relative terms need to be explained with respect to something - not ad hoc! If language rules are a simple list of true statements, then the term "language rule" remains unexplained instead of the unexplained "analytical". "Language rule" is not an intrinsic property. Language rules should be relative to the truth condition of a language. >Truth conditions. Problem: there is no distinction of a subclass that would intrinsically be more a language rule. Important argument: if "true regarding language rule": then it is not truth analytical in contrast to another. - - - Lauener XI 134 Language rules/Lauener: always need intensions, they are not extensional. >Intensions, >Extensions, >Extensionality.}, note = { Quine I W.V.O. Quine Word and Object, Cambridge/MA 1960 German Edition: Wort und Gegenstand Stuttgart 1980 Quine II W.V.O. Quine Theories and Things, Cambridge/MA 1986 German Edition: Theorien und Dinge Frankfurt 1985 Quine III W.V.O. Quine Methods of Logic, 4th edition Cambridge/MA 1982 German Edition: Grundzüge der Logik Frankfurt 1978 Quine V W.V.O. Quine The Roots of Reference, La Salle/Illinois 1974 German Edition: Die Wurzeln der Referenz Frankfurt 1989 Quine VI W.V.O. Quine Pursuit of Truth, Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Unterwegs zur Wahrheit Paderborn 1995 Quine VII W.V.O. Quine From a logical point of view Cambridge, Mass. 1953 Quine VII (a) W. V. A. Quine On what there is In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (b) W. V. A. Quine Two dogmas of empiricism In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (c) W. V. A. Quine The problem of meaning in linguistics In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (d) W. V. A. Quine Identity, ostension and hypostasis In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (e) W. V. A. Quine New foundations for mathematical logic In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (f) W. V. A. Quine Logic and the reification of universals In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (g) W. V. A. Quine Notes on the theory of reference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (h) W. V. A. Quine Reference and modality In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VII (i) W. V. A. Quine Meaning and existential inference In From a Logical Point of View, , Cambridge, MA 1953 Quine VIII W.V.O. Quine Designation and Existence, in: The Journal of Philosophy 36 (1939) German Edition: Bezeichnung und Referenz In Zur Philosophie der idealen Sprache, J. Sinnreich (Hg), München 1982 Quine IX W.V.O. Quine Set Theory and its Logic, Cambridge/MA 1963 German Edition: Mengenlehre und ihre Logik Wiesbaden 1967 Quine X W.V.O. Quine The Philosophy of Logic, Cambridge/MA 1970, 1986 German Edition: Philosophie der Logik Bamberg 2005 Quine XII W.V.O. Quine Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York 1969 German Edition: Ontologische Relativität Frankfurt 2003 Quine XIII Willard Van Orman Quine Quiddities Cambridge/London 1987 K II siehe Wol I U. Wolf (Hg) Eigennamen Frankfurt 1993 Q XI H. Lauener Willard Van Orman Quine München 1982 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=269241} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=269241} }