@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Evans,Gareth}, subject = {Rigidity}, note = {Stalnaker I 198 "Dthat" rigidity: is a rigid-making operator: the object should thus be defined as the same in all possible worlds. Rigidity/rigid/Evans: e.g. Julius/Zip/Evans/Stalnaker: "The inventor of the zip, we call him Julius" - the example can be interpreted in two ways: A) as an abbreviation of a complex singular term "dthat [the inventor of the zip]". Then "inventor of the zip" is part of the meaning. And it is a logical truth that he invented it. B) as a determination: that Julius is the name of the person. Then it would be a semantic ((s) non-logical connection) between name and person. - Then the role of the description would be to set the reference. For example, someone hears the name: Case A) then he/she does not understand the utterance - then "dthat [the person to which Stalnaker referred to in the situation]" ad B) if the semantic properties of "Julius" are part of the historical causal chain, then the competent speaker does not need to know anything about it. Cf. >Operators. }, note = { EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 Stalnaker I R. Stalnaker Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=269864} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=269864} }