@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Searle,John R.}, subject = {Terminology}, note = {I 43/44 "Topic-neutral" (smart): "topic-neutral" is not nomological. SearleVsTopic Neutral: e.g. digestion needs no additional state to be described separately. - - - I 198 ff Background/Searle: in the background are the skills and knowledge that can make the consciousness work (e.g. understanding an image: is someone moving uphill/downhill?). The same real meaning determines in different backgrounds different satisfaction conditions. Background: the background itself is not an intention, "assume" has no explicit propositional content and no explicit belief (e.g. objects are fixed). Network: is additional knowledge (cannot interpret itself). The network is intentional but it is no ability (it exists even during sleep), e.g. "Bush is president". - - - I 217 Searle: the rules do not interpret themselves, they really need a background to work. Background: is not a rule system. - - - III 194 Background/Searle: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box. The background helps us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances. - - - II 115 Perceptual experiences and memories are causally self-referential. - - - III 42 Regulative rules/Searle: these rules regulate pre-existing activities. Constitutive rules: constitutive rules create the possibility of activities, e.g. chess rules. III 39 Constitutive rules/Searle: are there any constitutive rules for cocktail parties and wars? What makes something a constitutive rule? - - - V 59 Def semantic structure: a language can be understood as a convention-based realization of a series of groups of underlying constitutive rules. - - - IV 253 Semantic rules/language rules/Searle: semantic rules or language rules are rules for linguistic action on closer inspection. - - - VII 436 Sentence meaning/Searle: the sentence meaning consists in the speech act potential. - - - II 25 Sincerity condition: the sincerity condition is internal to the speech acts. - - - III 44ff Institutional facts/Searle: e.g. money, elections, universities, chess, etc. First, there must be something physical. Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true, like a condition. - - - III 212 Fact/Searle: a fact is a general name for the conditions how sentences relate to ... something. - - - II 32 Belief/Searle: spirit on world orientation. Intentional states/Searle: intentional states are both caused and realized in the structure of the brain. - - -}, note = { Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=274131} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=274131} }