@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {Searle,John R.},
subject = {Terminology},
note = {I 43/44
"Topic-neutral" (smart): "topic-neutral" is not nomological.
SearleVsTopic Neutral: e.g. digestion needs no additional state to be described separately.
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I 198 ff
Background/Searle: in the background are the skills and knowledge that can make the consciousness work (e.g. understanding an image: is someone moving uphill/downhill?). The same real meaning determines in different backgrounds different satisfaction conditions. Background: the background itself is not an intention, "assume" has no explicit propositional content and no explicit belief (e.g. objects are fixed). Network: is additional knowledge (cannot interpret itself). The network is intentional but it is no ability (it exists even during sleep), e.g. "Bush is president".
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I 217
Searle: the rules do not interpret themselves, they really need a background to work.
Background: is not a rule system.
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III 194
Background/Searle: Moore's hands belong to the background. They are not in a safe deposit box. The background helps us to determine the truth conditions of our utterances.
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II 115
Perceptual experiences and memories are causally self-referential.
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III 42
Regulative rules/Searle: these rules regulate pre-existing activities. Constitutive rules: constitutive rules create the possibility of activities, e.g. chess rules.
III 39
Constitutive rules/Searle: are there any constitutive rules for cocktail parties and wars? What makes something a constitutive rule?
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V 59
Def semantic structure: a language can be understood as a convention-based realization of a series of groups of underlying constitutive rules.
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IV 253
Semantic rules/language rules/Searle: semantic rules or language rules are rules for linguistic action on closer inspection.
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VII 436
Sentence meaning/Searle: the sentence meaning consists in the speech act potential.
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II 25
Sincerity condition: the sincerity condition is internal to the speech acts.
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III 44ff
Institutional facts/Searle: e.g. money, elections, universities, chess, etc. First, there must be something physical.
Fact/Searle: a fact is something outside the statement that makes it true, like a condition.
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III 212
Fact/Searle: a fact is a general name for the conditions how sentences relate to ... something.
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II 32
Belief/Searle: spirit on world orientation.
Intentional states/Searle: intentional states are both caused and realized in the structure of the brain.
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note = { Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
},
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url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=274131}
}