@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {McDowell,John}, subject = {Theories}, note = {I 188 Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (E.g. here is a black swan) cannot be distributed among the sentences of the theory. >Quine-Duhem thesis, >Indeterminacy of meaning, >Gavagai. I 189 This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning. McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our observation language is distinct form our theoretical language, so that the relevant experience is not already expressed in the theoretical language. >indeterminacy/McDowell, >Concept/McDowell, >Experience/McDowell, >Observation language.}, note = { McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=274444} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=274444} }