@misc{Lexicon of Arguments,
title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024},
author = {McDowell,John},
subject = {Theories},
note = {I 188
Theory/Quine/Duhem: the contestability through experience (E.g. here is a black swan) cannot be distributed among the sentences of the theory.
>Quine-Duhem thesis, >Indeterminacy of meaning, >Gavagai.
I 189
This is actually an argument for the indeterminacy of meaning.
McDowellVsQuine: but the argument is only tenable if our observation language is distinct form our theoretical language, so that the relevant experience is not already expressed in the theoretical language.
>indeterminacy/McDowell, >Concept/McDowell, >Experience/McDowell, >Observation language.},
note = { McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell,
},
file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=274444}
url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=274444}
}