@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Nagel,Thomas}, subject = {Theories}, note = {I 52 Problem for all rationalist and realist theories: if we cannot say that logic is ultimately rooted in our practices, while this becomes evident in the fact that we find conclusions in conflicts, namely in judgements about which we agree naturally. We cannot say that logic depends on such practices, because that would in turn violate these practices in which logic has the last word. >Logic, >Practise, >Justification, >Ultimate judstification. I 53 But it is it not true that the relevance of our practices shows in that this last word is the last word in our thoughts and argumentations. This is derived from Wittgenstein. >Solipsism/Wittgenstein. - - - Frank I 132f Theory/Nagel: must be understandable without the ability to assume a particular position. Thomas Nagel (1974): What Is It Like to Be a Bat?, in: The Philosophical Review 83 (1974), 435-450}, note = { NagE I E. Nagel The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation Cambridge, MA 1979 Nagel I Th. Nagel The Last Word, New York/Oxford 1997 German Edition: Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999 Nagel II Thomas Nagel What Does It All Mean? Oxford 1987 German Edition: Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990 Nagel III Thomas Nagel The Limits of Objectivity. The Tanner Lecture on Human Values, in: The Tanner Lectures on Human Values 1980 Vol. I (ed) St. M. McMurrin, Salt Lake City 1980 German Edition: Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991 NagelEr I Ernest Nagel Teleology Revisited and Other Essays in the Philosophy and History of Science New York 1982 Fra I M. Frank (Hrsg.) Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=274447} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=274447} }