@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Evans,Gareth}, subject = {Judgments}, note = {McDowell I 73 Judgment/McDowellVsEvans: (...) the judgment does not introduce a new kind of content! It simply confirms the conceptual content that comes from experience! Justification/McDowell: justification does not have to consist in one derivation step from one content to another. A typical perception judgment makes a selection, from a richer content provided by the experience. McDowell I 74 Evans/McDowell: important: Evans says that experiences are states of the information system, but he does not say that the idea of experience is identical with the idea of the information system. The states of the information system with its non-conceptual content (for example, of animals) are not ipso facto states of a conscious subject. McDowell I 84 Judgment/Evans: Evans thinks that view and concept must be divided between experience and judgment. (McDowellVsEvans).}, note = { EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Evans I Gareth Evans "The Causal Theory of Names", in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 47 (1973) 187-208 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Evans II Gareth Evans "Semantic Structure and Logical Form" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Evans III G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 McDowell I John McDowell Mind and World, Cambridge/MA 1996 German Edition: Geist und Welt Frankfurt 2001 McDowell II John McDowell "Truth Conditions, Bivalence and Verificationism" In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=279077} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=279077} }