@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Goodman,Nelson}, subject = {Truth}, note = {I 31 Truth/Goodman: provided that a world consists of statements, truth may be relevant. But truth cannot be defined or be checked by compliance with "the world". Truth is a docile and an obedient servant, no severe master. >Reality, >World, >Nature, >Correspondence theory. I 34 The scientist who assumes he is especially looking for truth deceives himself. He does not care about trivial truths he could grind out. "The truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth": this would be a wrong and paralyzing policy for any world producer. The whole truth would be too much, it is too large, too variable and too burdened by trivial. Nothing but the truth would be too little, for some right versions are not true (they are either false or neither true nor false). I 147 GoodmanVsTarski: Tarski must be revised: "'Snow is white' is true according to a version if and only if snow is in accordance with this version of white". >Truth definition/Tarski, >Disqotation scheme. I 149 Truth/Goodman: truth is like intelligence exactly what the tests test. I 146 ff GoodmanVsPragmatism: then the pragmatist thesis loses at the moment of victory its force: because that truths best meet the purpose of acquiring truths is as empty as it is obvious. Accuracy/Goodman: Goodman suggests high acceptability as an accuracy scale. >Acceptability. --- III 242 The truth of a hypothesis is a matter of fitting. Of fitting to a theory building and the fitting of hypotheses and theory to the existing data and the facts one will encounter. Truth/Goodman: we should reserve truth for the symbols in sentence form. --- IV 208 Accuracy/Goodman: accuracy does not seek a formal definition. Accuracy is a matter of fitting and activity. IV 205 Accuracy and truth sometimes go apart even in statements. Although snow is white, the statement 'snow is white' can sometimes be incorrect.}, note = { G IV N. Goodman Catherine Z. Elgin Reconceptions in Philosophy and Other Arts and Sciences, Indianapolis 1988 German Edition: Revisionen Frankfurt 1989 Goodman I N. Goodman Ways of Worldmaking, Indianapolis/Cambridge 1978 German Edition: Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984 Goodman II N. Goodman Fact, Fiction and Forecast, New York 1982 German Edition: Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988 Goodman III N. Goodman Languages of Art. An Approach to a Theory of Symbols, Indianapolis 1976 German Edition: Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=282303} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=282303} }