@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Field,Hartry}, subject = {Truth Theory}, note = {II 21 Truth-Theory/Truth-Definition/TarskiVsField: semantic concepts are not necessary and not philosophically interesting for a T-theory. >Semantics. FieldVsTarski: Tarski has only lists for denotation: (e)(a) (e is a name which denotes a) ⇔ (e is "c1" and a is c1) or (e is "c2" and a is c2) or ... II 24 Truth-Theory/utterance conditions/Truth/T-theory/Quine: (Quine, 1953b(1), p. 138) the conditions of expression are all that is needed to make the concept "true" clear. - (Field dito). E.g. Alabama-Example: a friend says that in the southern state of Alabama is snow which is a foot high. - Therefore, utterance conditions are important. Question: why do we need causal theories of the reference beyond the Truth-schema? - That does not work anyway, since we are on Neurath's ship. ((s). That is, meanings change in the course of language development). >Language evolution, >Meaning change, >Meaning. Still: Solution/Field: psychological models about the (inner) connection to reality. - (Do not attach a theory from the outside). - This psychological connection is still physical. 1. W.V.O. Quine 1953. "Notes on the theory of reference". In: From al Logical Point of View. New York: Harper.}, note = { Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=282963} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=282963} }