@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Fodor,Jerry}, subject = {Perception}, note = {Rorty I 255 FodorVsRyle/Rorty: a simple story about learned associations will not be enough: the expectancy system would have to be abstract and complicated in the same sense. Because the recognized identities are surprisingly independent of the physical uniformities of stimuli among one another. >Stimuli. Rorty I 255 RortyVsFodor: suppose we needed an abstract recipe for the recognition of similarities among potentially infinite differences. Why must the recipe be so abstract at all? Presumably, we must be able to identify similarities. But then we do not need the idea of ​​a "non-abstract" recipe, because every recipe must be able to do this. E.g. Rorty: the possible qualitative differences of the contents of a package of chocolate cookies are also potentially infinite. Rorty: so if we talk about "complex expectation systems" or programs or control systems at all, we are always talking about something abstract. Dilemma: either the explanation of the acquisition of such control systems requires the postulation of other control systems or they are not learned at all. >Learning. Either: 1) There is infinite regress, because what is true for recognition would also need to apply for learning. Or 2) we end up back at Ryle: people have an ability that they have not learned. Rorty I 269 Fodor rehabilitates the traditional British theories of perception: "it is an empirical question whether psychological processes are computer processes! If they are, our perception must work in a way that a description of the environment that is not done in a vocabulary whose terms represent values ​​of physical variables, is calculated on the basis of a description made in such a vocabulary. >Perception, >Vocabulary. I Rorty 269 Fodor: why should there not be stimuli for the whole organism? Then you could discover a stimulus variant "bottle". Perception requires the choice of an independent vocabulary for the representation of the inputs. Fodor's thesis: all perceptual knowledge is transferred by the activity of sensory transducers. Rorty I 269 Fodor: if we do not want to realize the talk of the information processing, we need to use something that our subject need not necessarily know as its input. Rorty question: could it turn out that the input is not completed on the retina but half way or elsewhere? Fodor presumes: yes, it just depends on which design of the black box the organism can best be considered to be split into converter and processor, so that the best theory comes out.}, note = { F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Rorty I Richard Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton/NJ 1979 German Edition: Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997 Rorty II Richard Rorty Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000 Rorty II (b) Richard Rorty "Habermas, Derrida and the Functions of Philosophy", in: R. Rorty, Truth and Progress. Philosophical Papers III, Cambridge/MA 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (c) Richard Rorty Analytic and Conversational Philosophy Conference fee "Philosophy and the other hgumanities", Stanford Humanities Center 1998 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (d) Richard Rorty Justice as a Larger Loyalty, in: Ronald Bontekoe/Marietta Stepanians (eds.) Justice and Democracy. Cross-cultural Perspectives, University of Hawaii 1997 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (e) Richard Rorty Spinoza, Pragmatismus und die Liebe zur Weisheit, Revised Spinoza Lecture April 1997, University of Amsterdam In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (f) Richard Rorty "Sein, das verstanden werden kann, ist Sprache", keynote lecture for Gadamer’ s 100th birthday, University of Heidelberg In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty II (g) Richard Rorty "Wild Orchids and Trotzky", in: Wild Orchids and Trotzky: Messages form American Universities ed. Mark Edmundson, New York 1993 In Philosophie & die Zukunft, , Frankfurt/M. 2000 Rorty III Richard Rorty Contingency, Irony, and solidarity, Chambridge/MA 1989 German Edition: Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992 Rorty IV (a) Richard Rorty "is Philosophy a Natural Kind?", in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 46-62 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (b) Richard Rorty "Non-Reductive Physicalism" in: R. Rorty, Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth. Philosophical Papers Vol. I, Cambridge/Ma 1991, pp. 113-125 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (c) Richard Rorty "Heidegger, Kundera and Dickens" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 66-82 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty IV (d) Richard Rorty "Deconstruction and Circumvention" in: R. Rorty, Essays on Heidegger and Others. Philosophical Papers Vol. 2, Cambridge/MA 1991, pp. 85-106 In Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum, , Stuttgart 1993 Rorty V (a) R. Rorty "Solidarity of Objectivity", Howison Lecture, University of California, Berkeley, January 1983 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1998 Rorty V (b) Richard Rorty "Freud and Moral Reflection", Edith Weigert Lecture, Forum on Psychiatry and the Humanities, Washington School of Psychiatry, Oct. 19th 1984 In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty V (c) Richard Rorty The Priority of Democracy to Philosophy, in: John P. Reeder & Gene Outka (eds.), Prospects for a Common Morality. Princeton University Press. pp. 254-278 (1992) In Solidarität oder Objektivität?, , Stuttgart 1988 Rorty VI Richard Rorty Truth and Progress, Cambridge/MA 1998 German Edition: Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=283630} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=283630} }