@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 28 Mar 2024}, author = {Lewis,David K.}, subject = {Time}, note = {V 32 Time/Arrow of time/Past/Future/Lewis: future: depends counterfactually (not only causally) on the present. >Causal dependence/Lewis, >Counterfactual dependence/Lewis. Asymmetry: former things do not depend on later ones - we find no counterfactual conditional that explains what would have been different in the past if the presence was different - such a counterfactual conditional would be unclear at most. V 33 Asymmetry: we can use all assumptions about the past, but not about the future - assumptions about the past are not counter factually dependent - therefore they can serve as auxiliary hypotheses. V 35 Time/Asymmetry/Counterfactual conditional/Lewis: Asymmetry: comes about like this: wA>wC assumes that C is later, if C is earlier, the counterfactual conditionals are only true if C is true - the counterfactual conditional tells us, like the way, how things are earlier, not depending on how things are later. V 36 Time Arrow/Epistemic/Asymmetry/Lewis: the asymmetry (that we know more about the past than about the future) is gradual, no difference in kinds. V 37f Time/Asymmetry/Past/Future/Lewis: 1) the epistemic contrast (that we know more about the past) is gradual. - 2) (irrelevant) - 3) Even determinism would allow an asymmetry. - 4) past, present and future are equally unchangeable. - That t is later, is irrelevant. V 38 5) in a sense we can change the future by our present actions, however. - Asymmetry: branch in the future: are the alternatives under counterfactual assumptions. - Past: here the fact remains the same, even in counterfactual assumptions. V 57 Time/Laws of Nature /LoN/Asymmetry/Lewis: if there is an asymmetry (between past and future). - Then it is a property of time, not of the laws. - It makes a difference between possible worlds. >Possible world/Lewis. V 66 Asymmetry/Time/Lewis: my argument for it is empirical. - Too many traces would have to be hidden later on. --- V 94 Time/Asymmetry/Past/Future/Possible world/Lewis: the asymmetry is contingent. - i.e. the properties which justify the distinction between past and future opportunities. They may be different from possible worlds to other possible worlds. >Asymmetry, >Past, >Present, >Future, >Time traveller/Lewis, >Timelessness/Lewis.}, note = { Lewis I David K. Lewis Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989 Lewis I (a) David K. Lewis An Argument for the Identity Theory, in: Journal of Philosophy 63 (1966) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (b) David K. Lewis Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications, in: Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (1972) In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis I (c) David K. Lewis Mad Pain and Martian Pain, Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. 1, Ned Block (ed.) Harvard University Press, 1980 In Die Identität von Körper und Geist, , Frankfurt/M. 1989 Lewis II David K. Lewis "Languages and Language", in: K. Gunderson (Ed.), Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VII, Language, Mind, and Knowledge, Minneapolis 1975, pp. 3-35 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Lewis IV David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983 Lewis V David K. Lewis Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986 Lewis VI David K. Lewis Convention. A Philosophical Study, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Konventionen Berlin 1975 LewisCl Clarence Irving Lewis Collected Papers of Clarence Irving Lewis Stanford 1970 LewisCl I Clarence Irving Lewis Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=287090} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=287090} }