@misc{Lexicon of Arguments, title = {Quotation from: Lexicon of Arguments – Concepts - Ed. Martin Schulz, 29 Mar 2024}, author = {Boghossian,Paul}, subject = {Negation}, note = {Wright I, 276 Negation/Logic/Truth/Correctness/correct: If both truth and correctness are involved, there is a distinction between the A) real, strict negation: it transforms every true or correct sentence into a false or incorrect one, another negation form: B) Negation: it acts so that a true (or correct) sentence is constructed exactly when its argument does not reach any truth. >Truth, >Correctness, Negation/WrightVsBoghossian: the proposition (>Nonfactualism) actually assumes that ""A" is true" should be complementary to the negation of A in the latter sense. A perfectly reasonable counter-proposal, however, is that A should rather be complementary to the strict concept of the former negation. Then, in the case that A is merely correct, the valuation of ""A" is true" is also correct and the application of the truth predicate will be generally conservative. >Conservativity. WrightVsVs: but there are problems at a different end now: the transition of (i) to (ii): the seemingly unassailable principle that only one sentence with a truth condition can be true would have the form of the conditional: (II) "A" is true> "A" has a truth condition I 276/277 And any conservative matrix for ""A" is true" endangers this principle in the case where A is not true but correct. For then the conservative matrix ""a" is true" is evaluated as correct. The consequent (II) that "A" has a truth condition (a fact that makes it true) will then probably be incorrect. >Truth conditions.}, note = { Bogh I Paul Boghossian Fear of Knowledge: Against Relativism and Constructivism Oxford 2007 Boghe I Peter Boghossian A manual for Creating Atheists Charlottesville 2013 }, file = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=344827} url = {http://philosophy-science-humanities-controversies.com/listview-details.php?id=344827} }